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ABSTRACT 
Terrorist and transnational criminal organizations are evolving into enormous national 
security threats. Their embrace of advanced information and communications systems 
has significantly enhanced their organizational efficiency as well as provided them with 
an exceptional disruption weapons system. The US's heavy reliance upon the information 
infrastructure, along with the disruptive and destructive capabilities of cyberterror and 
cybercrime, have creat~d a potentially very dangerous situation. In addition, the 
proliferation of advanced weapons systems into terrorist hands, including WMDs, 
requires the US to reassess its counter-terror and crime policy. The. current strategy in 
place to combat these entities is lacking, as can be seen by the World Trade Center and 
Oklahoma City bombings. The employment of an aggressive, proactive strategy that 
focuses on information operations is necessary to constrain these growing threats. The 
proactive strategy is accompanied by new significant costs. However, when compared to 
the cost of current US strategy, proactive measures are seen to provide enormous overall 
savings. The proactive strategy is comprised of three elements: intelligence collection, 
disruption and destruction. Today's advanced technologies provide the US with the tools 
and weapons necessary to engage in and win the war against terror and crime. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Current US security policy indicates an overwhelming belief in an established 
state of peace and the confidence that our anned forces can adequately respond to all 
emerging threats. The Department of Defense budget has seen a drastic reduction from an 
all time high of 338.3 billion dollars in 1989 to 237.4 billion in 1997, (in constant 1987 
dollars). In addition, force manning levels have dropped from 2. 13million active duty 
personnel in 1989 to 1.47 million in 1996.1 
US security strategy consists of three key elements; Shape, Respond and Prepare.2 
These elements support the belief in a current state of peace and lack of significant threat. 
To expand this point further, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that our.military 
objectives are to "promote peace and stabiiity and when necessary, to defeat adversaries." 
The term "when necessary" implies that US policy makers currently see no legitimate and 
active threat to US security. 
The most significant event to inspire this belief and one that promoted a shift in 
the national security pplicy occurred in 1991. The dissolution of the Soviet Union 
eliminated the only true viable contender to US wannaking capability. This left the 
United States possessing the most dominant military force in the world. The removal of 
Soviet troops from Eastern Europe has averted what was once believed to be an 
inevitable major anned conflict in the European theater. Since these dramatic events, the 
potential for a conflict involving significant US conventional forces or the use of nuclear 
, I Taken from US Department of Commerce, 117 edition, Economics & Statistics administration. 
L-______________ --.: ___________________________________ _ 
weapons has become remote. As Russia struggles with the transformation to a democratic 
system, the potential exists for the return of the "evil empire." However, the threat of war 
remains low due to Russia's massive domestic problems and significant deterioration in 
its military readiness and weapons systems. Perhaps the largest immediate concern to US 
national security is the potential proliferation of Soviet nuclear material. 
While the nUmber of countries that possess nuclear arms is increasing in number, 
the threat posed by states actually using these weapons is minimal.3 The threat that a state 
will use these weapons against the US is even more unlikely due to most countries lack of 
delivery technology and fear of US massive retaliation. As seen recently with both India 
and Pakistan, possession of these weapons is more of a cry for recognition than a 
legitimate threat of use. 
China, arguably US's next great power rival, is still estimated to be many years 
away from obtaining a military level adequate to confront US forces. In addition, analysis 
of China's foreign policy objectives indicates no apparent ill-intentions to US interests. 
The area that currently demands greatest US attention is the Korean Peninsula. While N. 
Korea possesses a large conventional force, the maintenance and operational efficiency of 
the equipment and personnel are estimated to be very poor. Even the use of nuclear 
weapons, in a "conventional" manner, would not significantly enhance N. Korea's 
military and political position against the vastly superior combined ROK and US 
coalition. 
2 National Military Strategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare now- A Military Strategy for a New Era, CJCS, 
1997 
3 This argument is presented in Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation ojWar,(New York: The Free 
Press, 1991), pp. 2-10 
2 
On the conventional battlefield, the United States maintains an overwhelming 
superiority in military capability. The conduct of Operation Desert Storm exemplified the 
relative ease with which US military forces were able to defeat a significantly large army. 
While the quality of Iraqi forces was clearly suspect, they were overwhelmingly the 
dominant regional military force. US commitment to maintain its high quality force, the 
continued research and development of communications and intelligence technologies 
and a strong economic ba~e will ensure that this conventional military dominance 
continues. As state~ in" the national military strategy; 
"Given the United States' military potential and ability to deploy to 
any region of conflict, it is unlikely that any regional power or 
coalition could amass sufficient conventional strength to defeat our 
Armed Forces."4 
The introduction and application of systems like "land warrior" and "applique" 
and ever evolving smart and "brilliant" weapons systems will continue to" enhance US 
warfighting capabilities and widen the gap between future competitors. In addition, the 
revamping of US doctrine which include concepts like "Total Spectrum Dominance" and 
"C4I for the Warrior" are part of a continued effort to ensure this dominance through 
ongoing capabilities and requirements apalysis. 
However, this confidence in the US military's ability to insulate the US from 
overt threat is an illusion created by an exclusive focus on state actors. When the threat 
from non-state actors is considered, this comfort zone quickly erodes. The potential for 
terrorist activity against American targets, both domestically and overseas, is an 
omnipresent threat that the US has never fully comprehended. While both the national 
4 National Military Strategy, 1997 
3 
and military security strategies acknowledge this threat, they provide little in terms of 
response, except to say: 
"We must increase our capabilities to counter these threats and 
adapt our military doctrine, training and equipment to ensure a rapid 
and effective joint and interagency response."5 
Historically, terrorist activity within the confines of the United States itself has 
been relatively minute in both quantity and quality. These events have been relegated to 
relatively inept and ineffe~tive organizations like the "weathermen" and the Puerto Rican 
based FLN. Thus, terrorism is not viewed as a major concern by the majority of the 
American public. This lack of public concern has made terrorism a relatively minor 
political issue, placing it near the bottom of the list of many politicians that need more 
"relevant" issues to get reelected. 
Recent events, including the Oklahoma city and the New York World Trade 
Center bombings, have hinted at the incredible vulnerabilities within the United States. 
These attacks, along with the increased publicity given to domestic militant 
organizations, have had only a modest sobering effect. In addition to the increased 
domestic threat, US c~mtinued involvement in world affairs will inevitably raise the 
animosities of some foreign state or non-state actors. The frustration over US 
"meddling," along with the inability to confront the US on the conventional battlefield, 
may compel them toward unconventional measures. This asymmetric method of warfare 
may include the use of terrorist tactics. 
The increased capabilities and diverse nature of terrorist organizations will 
increasingly present a serio~s threat to US interests abroad and within the US.6 Terrorists 
4 
have recently displayed an increased willingness to use more powerful explosives, 
including use of chemical and biological agents.7 This trend, along with the very real 
threat of nuclear proliferation into terrorist hands, presents the US with an unexpectedly 
high cost of continued neglect of this issue. 
While the thought of terrorist use of a nuclear device is sobering, a relatively new 
and vulnerable target has arisen: America's advanced computer-based infrastructure. The 
United States' ever increasing reliance upon information-based systems, in virtually 
every aspect of life, makes an exceptjonally rich target for terrorist acts of disruption. The 
advent of cyberterror poses a real and significant threat to the US.8 The Internet connects 
virtually all aspects of government, commerce and individual lives around the world. 
While this process has significantly increased efficiency, speed and availability of 
information, it also allows access by unauthorized and ill-intentioned persons. The 
incredible power of personal home computers has opened the realm of computer warfare 
to virtually every i~dividual that can afford a computer, a power outlet, and a phoneline. 
While the realm of traditional terrorist attacks was limited by both the expense of 
equipment and the moral dilemma of violence, the cyber terrorist has neither constraint. 
Disruptive terrorist attacks, because of their lack of lethality, are seen by some as morally 
more acceptable to both terrorist as well as the constituencies from which they desire 
acceptance and support. 
5 National Military Strategy, 1997 
6 The threat of modem terrorism is presented by Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism,(New York: 
Farrar Straus Giroux, 1995) 
7 John Deutch, "Terrorism: Think Again," Foreign Policy, March 1997 
8 The concepts of cyberterror are well presented by Bruce Hoffman in "Responding to Terrorism Across 
the Technological Spectrum," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 6, No.3, Autumn 1994 
5 
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Traditional US responses, when confronted with cyberterror, will be seriously 
challenged and must be reevaluated under such non-lethal yet exceptionally disruptive 
attacks. While Russia has proclaimed its right to respond to cyberterror with nuclear 
weapons9, the US has not yet sufficiently addressed this issue. 
The prospect of cyberterror also provides the terrorist with increased anonymity. 
Traditionally, terrorists wanted publicity to gain recognition for their cause. Today's 
terrorist may have no such desires. Terrorism as a form of retribution or as an asymmetric 
method of warfare is both harder to combat and typically more violent. Cyberterror's 
relative ease of entry, anonymity, and disruptive capability makes this threat potentially 
more dangerous than conventional terrorist acts of destruction. 
In addition to the increased threat of terrorism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
has opened the floodgates for transnational criminal organizations. Once k~pt in check by 
hard-line Soviet intelligence and police agencies, many new and ethnically oriented-
criminal enterprises have emerged within the former Soviet Union. These Russian 
organizations along with the Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakuza (to name only two), 
have brought about an unprecedented level of world crime. Displaying exceptional 
willingness to cooperate, these organizations have established ties amongst themselves 
and the more established Colombian drug cartels and Sicilian Mafia. These relationships 
have proven extremely beneficial, opening new drug distribution areas, while breathing 
new life into declining- organizations. 
Taking advantage of unstable and weak governments, these criminal organizations 
have been able to flourish. In many cases these groups are able to dictate state action 
9 Timothy L. Thomas, "The Threat of Information Operations: A Russian Perspective," Pfaltzgraff, op cit 
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through corruption, bribes, threats and outright murder. This is best exemplified in 
Colombia, in which the level of corruption has reached incredible proportions and has 
undermined the ability of the official government to function appropriately. This 
influence over government action is not only detrimental to a state's ability to preside 
within its own territory, but affects the state's foreign policy as welL This can lead to 
decreased cooperation with US law enforcement efforts, and conflicts in immigration, 
customs, trade, and basic international relations.1O The continued and virtually unchecked 
assault from these criminal organizations constitutes a direct attack upon US society 
itself. The blatant disregard for US law has and will continue to result in lives lost, 
billions of dollars in lost revenue, violent crime and a general destabilization of US 
society. The United States must treat this assault as an act of war and take appropriate 
measures to reverse the process which is progressively deteriorating the established 
society and security of the nation. 
Similar to terrorists, TCOs are taking full advantage of the information revolution, 
and have subsequently become significantly more organized and efficient. The 
technological capabilities and personnel discipline exercised by these groups is 
exceptional. Many have enlisted the help of professionals in the business, intelligence and 
communications realms. As these organizations continue to expand they become 
increasingly more reliant upon advanced technologies to organize and maintain their 
"business" affairs. Among the greatest utilities of these systems is their ability to transfer 
and launder huge amounts of "dirty" money around the world. In addition, computers 
--------------------~,- , 
10 A good discussion on the threats of transnational criminals is provided by Phil Williams, "Transnational 
Criminal Organizations and National Security," Survival, Vol. 36, No, 1, Spring 1994, pp, 96-113 
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have been used to perfonn advanced criminal business schemes. As FBI director Louis 
Freeh stated; 
"It is a much more sophisticated type of organized crime than we 
have ever seen in the United States. It goes to Cybercrime. It goes to 
complex fraud schemes. It goes to money laundering schemes and 
operations which involve hundreds of millions of dollars.,,11 
. The nature of both terrorists and criminals predisposes them toward fonning 
relationships with each other. Terrorist organizations tequire significant funding in order 
to function effectively. While some of this funding is gained through individual and state 
sponsorship, an increa~ed trend toward the conduct of illegal activity has occurred. The 
money, acquired primarily through drug trafficking, is utilized to bankroll terrorist 
activities and purchase state-of-the-art weaponry. In addition, criminal organizations have 
increasingly relied upon violent, terrorist-like attacks to intimidate or eliminate potential 
opposition. These attacks include activities against competitors, as well as law 
enforcement and governmental agencies. The trend of increased cooperation and the 
melting of roles between terrorist and criminal· has produced a significantly more diverse, 
complex, capable and agile threat. 
The strategy currently in place for combating both terrorism and crime is 
comprised of three elements: prosecution, prevention and no concessions.12 These tactics 
have created a US policy that, with limited exceptions, is reactive in nature. US counter-
crime and terrorist efforts go into full swing only after a crime or terrorist act has been 
II From testimony of FBI director Louis Freeh before the House of Representatives, Committee on 
International Relations, Oct 1,1997 
12 Taken from GAO report "Combating Terrorism," Sep 1997 
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committed. The attacks at the Oklahoma federal building as well as the New York World 
Trade Center are two clear examples in which the current US policy proved inadequate .. 
With regard to crime, the US has performed equally poorly, as evidenced by the 
Colombian cartel's booming $5 billion narcotics trade. As former secretary of state 
George Shultz said in 1984, "a purely passive defense does not provide enough of a 
deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it."J3 
In order to address these growing crises, the US must implement an aggressive, 
proactive strategy that carries the fight to the terrorists and criminals. The advance in 
information and communications systems provides the US with the tools and weapons 
necessary to carry this out. The conduct ofInforrnation Operations (IO) provides and 
exceptionally diverse and flexible capability that can be tailored to meet the 
characteristics of virtually any target. Within the proposed proactive strategy, IO is 
separated into two tactics: preemption and destruction. Preemption is conducted as a 
means of striking a target in expectation of being struck and acting to head· off the 
attacker prior to his ability to act. The disruptive tactic goes to the roots of terror and 
crime, attacking the terrorist or criminal organizations simply because they are terrorists 
or criminals. The proactive strategy will place these organizations on the defensive, 
hampering their ability to perform future operations. 
However, the increased proficiency of an IO"based proactive strategy is 
accompanied by new significant costs. In order to justify strategy implementation, these 
costs must be analyzed and compared to the costs incurred under the current reactive 
strategy. Analyzing the costs associated with terrorism and crime reveals seven major 
13 Patrick Pexton, "Cohen Focuses Sights on Terrorism," Navy Times, Sep 22, 1997 
9 
cost factors: human lives, material damage, reputation, precedent, escalation, foreign 
sovereignty, and civil liberties. These costs must be valued, not just in monetary terms, 
but in terms of their relative importance in maintaining American society. 
In order to implement this proactive strategy, US intelligence and federal law 
enforcement agencies must undergo a significant paradigm shift. In addition, politicians 
must be willing to withstand the public's expected outcry on any movement that would 
erode civil liberties in an~ way, while increasing law enforcement authority. Leaving the 
policy the way it pr~sently is invites disaster. The government is currently ill-organized to 
combat crime and terror. Perhaps the most telling aspect of this inefficiency is seen 
within the organizational quagmire that the US government has established in an effort to 
combat terrorism. With each agency closely guarding their "turf," the resulting structure 
is confusing and disconcerted. 
The drastic change seen within the terrorist and criminal organizations requires 
more than just the semantic changes in policy that have occurred since the 1970s. These 
phenomena are becoming increasingly dangerous. Their growth, abilities and destructive 
force must place them on the top of US national security issues. Adopting a proactive 
strategy that incorporates 10 is required in order to jar terrorists and transnational 
criminals from their current comfort zone. 
The following analysis is performed in four sections. Chapter II examines the 
emerging trends and capabilities of terrorist and criminal organizations. Chapter III takes 
a look at the current US reactive strategy and compares it to the proposed proactive one. 
Chapter IV analyzes the cost factors associated with both strategies and compares the 
10 
"aggregate costs." Chapter V discusses the evolving advanced capabilities within an IO-
based strategy. 
11 
II. OLD THREATS, NEW FACES 
Both terrorism and crime have been a part of human society since the beginning 
of time. Some terrorist acts have had repercussions beyond the immediate geographic 
region in which they were committed, as exemplified by the assassination of the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which started World War I. However, these acts have 
predominantly been a local and internal concern. Then, in 1972, a Palestinian terrorist 
attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich Germany ushered in what is called by 
many as the modem age of terrorism. 14 This attack displayed terrorists' increased 
willingness to ignore international boundaries, and to strike anywhere in the world. In the 
criminal realm, organizations grew in significance in US society in the 1920s, with the 
formation of the first national crime syndicate. This arrangement effectively linked all 
Mafia crime families across the country, creating a powerful and diverse threat to US 
society. Today's advanced information and communications technologies have energized 
the evolution of both terror and crime to new, higher levels of concern. The threats now 
posed by information-savvy terrorists and criminals are virtually boundless, in both the 
geographic and destructive sense. These "global" non-state actors currently present the 
US with perhaps the greatest threat to national security. Unlike North Korea or Iraq, 
which pose the potential for war, terrorists and criminals are actively and continuously 
engaging in a kind of warfare. 
14 John Deutch, "Terrorism: Think Again," Foreign Policy, Summer 1997 
l3 
One of the greatest barriers to understanding the magnitude of this threat is the 
lack of a mutually acceptable definition of terrorism 15. Not only does the definition of 
terrorism vary between countries, which many times employ a label in order to justify 
their actions, but feder~l agencies within the US itself are unable to formulate a 
consensus on what does or does not constitute a terrorist act. While government agencies 
spend considerable time and effort propounding their favored definitions, in an attempt to 
justify continued operating budgets, the terrorists and criminals continue to extend their 
operations at a staggering pace. In addition, criminal organizations' growing reliance on 
terrorist-type acts has exacerbated the problem. 16 Rather than attempt to modernize the 
definition of terrorism, this chapter will examine the predominant characteristics of these. 
modem non-state actors in order to provide arJ accurate assessment of the threat they pose 
to US national security. The characteristics that will be an~lyzed are their motives, 
professional status, sphere of influence, orgarJizational structure and operational tactics. 
A. MOTIVATION 
One of the keys to developing a proper counter strategy to both terrorism and 
crime is gaining a clear understanding of the motivations behind their existence. 17 
Terrorism has long been believed to be purely politically motivated. In fact, the majority 
of definitions have incorporated this notion into their description of terrorism. For 
IS The difficulties in determining an acceptable definition of terrorism is discussed in Brian Jenkins, "The 
Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems," Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, 
edited by Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason, 1978 
16 This blurring is discussed by Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 1996 as well as in Senator John Kerry's bbok The New War/New York: Simon & 
Shuster, 1997) . . 
14 
------------------
example, both the US Department of State and Defense both currently define terrorism as 
premeditated, politically motivated violence. While this belief may have held true for the 
majority of terrorist attacks in the 1970s, today's terrQrists may have few specific 
political aspirations. Even an act initially viewed as political may prove to hold other 
.underlying motives when more closely examined. Thus, a blurring of motivations is 
increasingly observed among these non-state entities. This is best exemplified by the 
numerous Colombian political assassinations that are performed in an effort to secure or 
enhance the drug cartel's prosperity I 8. While there are seemingly an unlimited number of 
motives behind the conduct of terrorist or criminal acts, the more significant threats can 
be categorized into one of three headings: political, religious, and monetaryl9. 
The political actor is perhaps the most familiar. The politically motivated terrorist 
attempts to bring about a change in the political system by ·use of coercive violent 
action2o• These groups resort to terrorism because they are unable to effect a chan~e 
through the legitimate state or international system. Thus political terrorism has been 
described as a tool for the weak. This description applies equally to a minority group (in 
terms of influence, not necessarily numbers) within a state system or a state within the 
international system. . 
17 This shift in terrorist motives is discussed in Roger Medd & Frank Goldstein, "International Terrorism on 
the Eve ofa New Millennium," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 20:281-316, 1997 
18 Since 1989, Colombia has lost four presidential candidates, more than sixty judges, more than seventy 
journalists and more than 1000 police officers, John Coleman, "Statement of the Assistant Administrator 
for Operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on· 
Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations," in Recent 
Developments in Transnational Crime Affecting u.s. Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy; Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters With Panama, Treaty Doc. 102-15 
19 Medd & Goldstein, "International terrorism on the eve of a new millenium," describe the three 
motivations as political, religious· and economic, p. 282 
20 An excellent discussion of "domestic" political terrorism is provided in Thomas Thornton, "Terror as a 
Weapon of Political Agitation," Internal War, edited by Harry Eckstein, (West Port: Greenwood Press, 
1964) 
15 
The politically motivated terrorist will normally aspire to one of four objectives. 
The terrorists may desire to influence a change on a particular government issue. This can 
be seen in the recent t~rrorist attacks in Israel which were intended to derail the Oct 98 
peace agreements with the Palestinians. The terrorists may desire a complete change in 
state leadership. This goal was exemplified by the assassination of US President 
McKinley21. The terrorist group may desire a complete separation from the existing state 
control system as is observed with the IRA's struggle with Britain. The last objective is to 
advance the political objective of a sponsor state. This last objective demonstrates 
terrorist employment as a form of warfare by a foreign government that is itself too weak 
to institute a change in the international system by means of direct force. 
One of the more dramatic developments in the realm of non-state actors is the rise 
of religious-based violence. While religion has played a role in many past cases,22 the 
resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism has driven it to the forefront of terrorism today. 
Perhaps the largest catalyst to this religious-based terrorism was the rise of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in Iran.23 While he cannot be held solely accountable for this upsurge, he was 
arguably the most influential factor in its rise. This religious motivation is extremely 
strong. Where the politically motivated terrorist believes that the current system is flawed 
or unjust, the religiously motivated terrorist believes that he has been ordained by a 
21 President Mckinley was assassinated by an anarchist named Leon Czolgosz, who desired to bring 
attention to the anarchist cause and upset the established order. 
22 David C. Rapoport discusses the ancient lineage of terrorism in his analysis of the Thugs, Assassins and 
the Zealots-Scarii, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 78 No.3, September, 1984. pp. 658-677 
23 In 1979 Khomeini declared "Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to the truth 
and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who 
struggle against imperialism. Weapons in our hands are used to realize divine and Islamic aspirations." 
Robin Wright, Sacred Rage, (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1986), p. 27 
16 
divine entity to purify the world. This total commitment creates a significantly more 
dangerous threat. Bruce Hoffman writes that; 
"Whereas secular terrorists generally consider indiscriminate 
violence immoral and counter productive, religious terrorists 
regard such violence as both morally justified and a necessary 
expedient for the attainment of their goals." 24 
In many cases, the religiously motivated terrorist believes that only by purging the world 
of the "infidels" will he fulfill "God's Will." This belief can easily lead to the use of 
extremely powerful weapons of destruction. To make matters worse, these individuals 
have become convinced that, by dying as a martyr, they will receive great rewards in the 
afterlife.2s These beliefs render many immune to the fear of dying for the "cause" and 
their God. Unfortunately for the US, this "cause" often includes the destruction of the 
American non-believers and the land of the "Great Satan." 
The final motivation behind terrorist and criminal acts is money. While crime has 
been a concern in virtually every nation (even Singapore), the advent of the information 
age has made it a significant world epidemic. rerrorists and criminals possess this 
monetary motivation in the ultimate pursuit of one of two goals. The first is simply to 
become rich and the second is to obtain wealth to purchase equipment and fund further 
operations. This second goal is seen within many terrorist organizations that do not 
24 Bruce Hoffman, "Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum," Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol 6, No.3, Autumn 1994, p. 346 
25 "A martyr has six privileges with God: he is forgiven his sins, he is shown a place in paradise he is 
redeemed from the torments of the grave, he is made secure from the fear of hell, and a crown of glory is 
placed on his head of which one ruby is worth more than the world and all that is in it, he will marry 72 of 
the Huris with black eyes, and his intercession will be accepted for 70 of his kinsmen." David Rapoport, 
"Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example from Islam," Origins o/Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, 
State o/Mind, ed. Walter Reich, (New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 117-118 
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possess adequate monetary support from either state or non-state sponsors. It is primarily 
within the realm of monetary motivation that the distinctions between terrorist and 
criminal organizations blur, as is exemplified by the numerous kidnappings performed in 
Latin America.26 Where the ultimate goal of these acts may have originally been political, 
the acquisition of money has become their primary focus. While the terrorists believe 
these acts are simply a means to an end, the accumulation of wealth can easily become an 
end unto itself. 
B. SPHERE OF INFLUENCE 
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, terrorism has evolved from an 
internal or domestic concern into an international dilemma. The eager acceptance of the 
information age by both terrorists and criminals has drastically expanded both the 
geographic scope and capabilities of their operations. Yet, while intelligence and 
communications technologies are now available to virtually every potential criminal or 
terrorist, not all will take advant~ge of the increased opportunities. The degree to which 
these organizations can benefit from the employment of advanced technologies is 
determined, in part, by their geographic area of concern. 
Traditional domestic terrorists play by slightly different rules than their 
international counterparts. While domestic terrorists may find it necessary to perform 
I 
operations outside of their immediate territory, the act is intended to influence local 
government and constituency. Thus in many cases they must limit their destructive 
26 "In Colombia someone is kidnapped every six hours. In Rio de Janeiro someone is kidnapped every four 
days. Brian Jenkins counted a total of6,OOO kidnappings in Latin America in 1994." Medd & Goldstein, p. 
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desires in order to prevent complete alienation?7 In their effort to gain public support, 
domestic terrorists must be seen to possess ability and strength. Thus, many of the 
domestic incidents, at least the politically motivated ones, are high profile events that 
cause minimal death and destruction. 
Timothy McVeigh, the convicted perpetrator of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
displays a second, potentially more dangerous, type of domestic terrorism. This type of 
terrorist conducts operations as a symbolic act, with only very broad, indefinite goals in 
mind. Many times this goal is simply to demonstrate disgust and disdain for the current 
system. These domestic terrorists will normally be of amateur status, as discussed below, 
and will be either loners or associated with a very small number of colleagues. Because . 
these domestic terrorists do not strive to gain public support, their destructive desires are 
no longer limited. Thus this type of domestic terrorist feel~ that the greater the 
destruction, the greater the victory and the louder the cry of disapproval. This type of 
domestic terrorism is also exemplified by the Japanese Aum Shin-Rikyo cult, which 
perpetrated the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system. 
Because these domestic groups have geographically, limited goals the logistics 
necessary to conduct operations are often less stringent than for international terrorists. 
Perhaps the greatest logistical difference is the monetary requirement. The domestic 
terrorist may not require extensive travel arrangements, or the establishment of "safe 
houses," which demand significant money and advanced planning. Working within the 
confines of native territory allows the domestic terrorist to blend into the population, thus 
facilitating movement while averting suspicion. "Home field advantage" also precludes 
285 
19 
the need for a great deal of complex administrative planning which includes the 
difficulties in obtaining weapons and transportation, as well as the minor detail of 
assembling the operators. 
In contrast to the domestic terrorist, the international actor is not directly focused 
on an internal struggle, but is, in effect, conducting a war against his foreign enemies. 
Also, in many cases, international terrorist acts are conducted in the interest of a third-
party sponsor, and are intended to advance the goals of a particular state. The CIA has 
attempted to differentiate between a state-sponsored terrorist and an autonomous actor. 
The CIA defines a terrorist sponsored by a foreign state as international, and the 
autonomous terrorist as transnational.·These definitions are inadequate, due to the 
terrorists' ability, and desire, to shift from one definition to the other whenever it suits 
their needs. 
The ultimate targets of international terrorists are often the politicians of foreign 
states, and the international community as a whole. Many times, terrorists have attempted 
to influence these policy makers by directly attacking the civilian population of that state. 
This tactic was clearly seen with the World Trade Center bombing, in 'Yhich the 
perpetrators were later associated with the Bin Laden terrorist network. Bin Laden's 
embrace of terrorism is an attempt to influence US policy toward the Arab world. 
The destructive potential of international terrorism is significantly greater than 
that of the domestic terrorist. The indifference to, or even desire for, substantial 
casualties, and the probable applause rather than alienation from the terrorist's 
27 This concept of the necessity of maintaining popular support is discussed in Martha Crenshaw, "How 
Terrorism Declines," Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 1991, Vol. 3, No. I p. 80 
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constituency and state sponsor, makes the international terrorist an extremely deadly 
threat. 
The international terrorist requires significant logistical support to carry out 
attacks, and a sizable monetary "buy in" requirement is a normal characteristic. This 
money is essential for the proper establishment of an operating base within a foreign 
state. This entails lodging, the purchase or smuggling of weapons, the potential 
requirement for falsified documents, and many other items. This monetary requirement 
can be alleviated through the support of a state or an independent sponsor. However, 
transferring funds may leave a "footprint" that can be traced to the originator. Thus the 
logistical requirements, as well as the ability to obtain funding, is considerably more 
difficult than with the domestic actor. In addition, the international terrorist finds himself 
operating in an unknown, and often times, hostile environment. While this creates an 
additional difficulty, the US's commitment to individual rights, regardless of nationality 
and background, alleviates much of this concern and actually facilitates the activities of 
the international terrorist. 
Transnational criminal organizations, by their very title, are international entities. 
While these organizations can be broken into their domestic and overseas components, 
the conduct of operations tends to support a single goal: to generate wealth. Because 
TCO goals are primarily monetary, they care little about their popUlarity. As is seen 
vividly in Russia and Colombia, criminal organizations utilize intimidation, bribery and 
violence to ensure that the domestic populace remains favorable to their operations. By 
expending only a fraction of one percent of the profits on administration and support, 
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these criminal organizations are easily able to meet their logistical requirements, both 
domestically and overseas. 
C. PROFESSIONAL STATUS 
One of the emerging trends of terrorist activity today is the shift toward . 
amateurization.28 While the Hollywood-envisioned "professional" remains a great 
concern, an increase in "part-time" terrorism has been observed. Amateur terrorists 
possess numerous distinct characteristics that separate them from their professional 
counterparts. In many cases, they lack any clearly defined command and control 
structure, and operations are approved on a consensus basis. The connections between 
sponsors, either state or otherwise, are also noticeably absent The size of the amateur 
organization is inherently very small, and is initially formed through an attraction to or 
common belief in an ideal, concern or religion. The advent of the Internet has accelerated 
this pattern. Being able to contact and communicate with others of like attitude, with 
virtually assured privacy, allows individuals like "white supremacists" to organize. 
Another common meeting place is religious worship areas. These individuals take full 
advantage of the Bill of Rights and exercise their right to congregate without fear of 
intrusion or surveillance. Many of these places of worship, while otherwise fully 
legitimate, allow extremists to view their opinions, gain support and solicit participants . 
. . 
They further provide a place to plan and stage operations, all under to guise of freedom of 
religion (e.g., the "Christian Identity Movement"). 
28 The concept of amateurization is provided by Bruce Hoffman, "Responding to Terrorism Across the 
Technological Spectrum," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 6 No.3, Autumn 1994 
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The ability of police to combat these threats is limited. The group's violent 
tendencies are normally unknown until after they have committed a terrorist act. Unlike 
professional terrorists, who have a history of utilizing high technology Il'l:ilitary 
equipment, the amateur utilizes over-the-counter material. Thus the tactic of tracing 
weapons and equipment becomes exceedingly difficult. In addition, the amateur groups 
may only form for the conduct of a single terrorist attack, then melt back into everyday 
life after its completion. This hampers the ability to form a profile on these groups, and 
thus analyze past operations in an attempt to determine future action. 
The accessibility of computer technology and the interconnectivity afforded by 
the World Wide Web provide the amateur terrorist with an exceptionally target rich 
environment. While labeling a computer hacker a "terrorist" may incite an argument, 
·there is no denying the damage that these individuals can produce. Regardless of 
motivation, these hackers must be viewed as a legitimate threat that has the potential to 
warrant national attention.29 
While the amateur terrorist presents the US with a relatively new and alarming 
threat, the professional terrorist remains the center of US attention. With the advent of the 
information age, the professional terrorist is a more elusive, sophisticated and, 
consequently, dangerous threat. The professional terrorist organization is historically 
characterized by its well defined command and control structure, training, and "full-time" 
commitment to the "job". While amateurs may come together to conduct a single act, 
professionals continuously plan operations and ensure the administrative logistics behind 
their survival. Some of these professional organizations, in particular the PLO, have 
extended their operations to include legitimate business practices that ensure their 
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continued monetary support. This monetary support allows access to state-of-the-art 
weapons and information systems. The full time employment allows the professional 
terrorist to fully analyze and observe potential targets. This analysis creates lucrative and 
productive targets, while significantly increasing the probability of success and escape. 
While the police and intelligence agencies know of the existence of the larger terrorist 
organizations, the terrorists themselves are becoming increasingly sophisticated in 
concealing their operations. 
Another disheartening aspect of professional terrorism is the growing cooperation 
that has been observed in their dealings with criminal organizations. This cooperation 
provides the terrorists with increased weapons technology, large monetary resources and, 
most threatening of all, the potential access to nuclear material. 30 As mentioned above, 
the motivations of these groups are increasingly becoming blurred. As terrorists 
accelerate their cooperation with criminal organizations, the threat to US security will 
increase exponentially. 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The significant advances in information and communications technologies have 
drastically altered the organizational structure oflegitimate business entities as well as ill-
intentioned non-state actors.3! As information systems continue to evolve, many terrorists 
and criminals will adapt their organizational structures to take full advantage of these 
29 #3 threat in current national security strategy 
30 For example, the Russian Mafia has expressed its desire to sell stolen Soviet nuclear material, Tim 
Zimmerman & Alan Cooperman, The Russian Connection, u.s. News and World Report, 23 October 1995 
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advanced technologies. Traditional, terrorist and criminal organizations are structured in 
simple hierarchical designs, with a "great leader" or "Don" overseeing virtually all 
material decisions. The passing of information is performed in a managerial style that 
starts at the top and works its way down to the operators. As the information revolution 
continues to progress it appears to be lessening the need for middle management 
positions. Within a networked design, information can be instantaneously dispersed 
throughout the organization with the simple push of a computer key. The advantages of 
such a networked system were quickly realized and evidence has been collected that 
confirms its implementation.32 
Criminal organizations have perhaps made the transition to new technologies even 
faster than terrorists. This may be due to the inherent business-like nature of criminal 
enterprise and the continued push for greater profits. These information systems have 
allowed for a more decentralized configuration consisting of numerous semi-autonomous 
cells that maintain a loose coupling to the command structure. This design" allows for a 
percentage of the profits from every cell to reach the apex, while allowing increased 
autonomy, and thus criminal initiative, to thrive at the lower levels. A classic example of 
this structure is seen with the Chinese Triads. The loosely affiliated "gangs" are left 
virtually unsupervised to conduct business as they deem fit and are allowed to continue as 
long as homage is paid to the greater "Tong." Where at one time the operating pace of 
criminal organizations was constrained by a hierarchical structure that weighed the 
31 The organizational structure of terrorist groups and the trend toward a networked design is analyzed by 
John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism, 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1999 forthcoming) " 
32 Computers and advanced communications systems were observed in a camp run by Osama bin Laden, 
Hamas has set up Internet pages and uses e-mail and chat rooms to communicate and coordinate activities, 
and a raid in Italy discovered computer and communications equipment in a GIA (an Algerian terrorist 
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consequence of every decision, today's autonomous cells are free to determine their own 
restrictions. As greed and increased competition demand greater profits, these cells 
blatantly disregard local and federal law enforcement. The criminal organizations of the 
information age conduct any and all business in which they can make a profit, ignoring 
the self-imposed restriction of the hierarchy. 
Similarly, terrorist organizations are converting to a network structure in an effort 
to enhance capabilities and expand areas of operations. Networked terrorist groups find 
themselves free from geographical constraints and the restrictive, time-consuming 
necessity to consult with leadership. While the network structure is being quickly 
embraced by professional groups, it has significantly advanced the trend toward 
amateurization, as discussed earlier. As the Internet allows groups to communicate freely 
around the globe, a call for violent action can quickly reac~ a receptive audience. This 
initial call may only present loose goals and guidelines and leave the more detailed 
decision making process, including target selection, to whoever wishes to take up the 
cause. This significantly decentralizes the organization, creating independent cells that no 
longer display loyalty to a leader but rather to a common g?al. This design maintains 
anonymity through out the organization, making it extremely difficult for intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies to conduct counter operations. This structure is exemplified by 
the white supremacists in the US. The lack of centralized control produces a tendency 
toward engaging in a greater number and more destructive acts. This operational freedom 
is appealing to groups that view their actions as a form of war. For more specific goals, in 
which operations are conducted in accordance with an overall strategy, this networked 
group) base. These are only a few of the examples which display terrorists willingness and capability to 
employ advanced information technologies, Arquilla, Ronfelt,& Zanini p. 26-27 
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structure is less appealing. Thus, terrorist organizations conducting actions on behalf of 
state sponsors are more likely to employ a hierarchical structure that can be more easily 
monitored and controlled. 
Some of the older terrorist organizations, like the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 
.and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) have found it difficult to 
make this transition to a networked structure. This reluctance to shift designs may be due 
to the lack of familiarity with new information systems33 and an aversion or fear of 
delegating authority to lower levels. The' "younger" terrorist organizations like the 
Islamic Jihad and the al-Gama' at al-Islamiyya, tend to attract a younger generation that 
is inherently more comfortable and acquainted with information and communication 
technologies. While these younger organizations tend toward a networked structure, they 
are also seen to be more religiously motivated. Thus, it becomes difficult to determine 
whether the increased activity level is due to organizational structure or religious . 
motivation. More likely than not, the result is a combination of the two. 
Enhanced administrative capabilities and procedures have primarily propelled the 
shift to the networked organizations. The affordability of computers and the 
interconnectivity of the World Wide Web have made communications around the globe 
extremely easy, efficient and affordable. The advancement in encryption techniques has 
made it virtually impossible for intelligence agencies to intercept communications.34 
Even if governments were able to decrypt messages, their ability to act on them may be 
significantly hampered, if not prohibited by domestic and intemationallaw. The legal 
33 Arquilla, Rondfelt & Zanini p. 28 
34 There is a trend toward the employment of encryption by criminal organizations and the inability of the 
• US government to keep up. An analysis of criminal use of encryption is provided by William Baugh and 
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right of any party, including extremist groups, to post home pages and conduct "chat 
rooms" greatly increases the capability to reach and influence thousands of individuals 
daily. The increased capabilities of faxes and cellular phones allow secure 
communications from virtually any location on earth. The incorporation of these 
information and communication-based assets has allowed terrorist and criminals to 
improve their efficiency by flattening their organizations and developing networked 
structures. 
E. TACTICS 
The operational tactics utilized by terrorists and criminals are representative of 
both their goals and capabilities. In the information age, these capabilities include the 
employment of conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction and 'the relatively 
new netwar attacks. Actual use of these weapons is determined by the extent to which 
their employment will advance the organization's particular goals. For example, 
domestic terrorists, whose goal is to gain public support for internal change, would shy 
away from utilizing a WMD. The use of such a violent weapon would most likely isolate 
the group more than win support. 
Traditional terrorist tactics have employed the gun and bomb as the staple of 
operations. A survey of terrorist incidents committed between 1968 and 1993 reveals that 
46 percent of all attacks were bombing incidents, with another 22 percent being attacks 
Dorothy Denning, "Encryption and Evolving Technologies: Tools of Organized Crime and Terrorism," 
Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 3, No.1, 1997 
28 
on installations with conventional weapons.35 These numbers reveal the probable terrorist 
intent to limit the number of casualties. In fact, less than a dozen attacks during this time 
period each claimed over 100 lives. Many experts believe that terrorists will maintain 
these tactics as their primary modus operandi.36 This belief is largely based on the fact 
that these tactics have been and will continue to be effective. These weapons have proven 
sufficiently violent to provide the terrorists with the publicity they were seeking, yet tame 
enough to avoid alienating support. Thus, conventional weapons are seen to best fit the 
goals of the politically motivated terrorist. 
While conventional weapons will continue to be employed by the professional 
terrorist, they also appeal to the amateur terrorist for numerous reasons. For starters, the 
skill level necessary to employ these weapons is normally quite low. Thus guns and 
bombs are suited to the amateur terrorist, whose skill level and ability to train effectively 
are also quite limited. With very little ability, the amateur terrorist is able to create "home 
made" explosives through directions provided over the Internet or in his hometown 
library. These weapons are also relatively inexpensive, which makes them attractive to 
the amateur terrorist who, for th~ most part, is self-financed. 
When analyzing the prospects of a WMD attack, the terrorist's motives, skill level 
and financial resources must be considered. Many experts have written on this vital 
subject with the consensus being that employment for political motives is unlikely.37 As 
35 These numbers were taken from Bruce Hoffman, "Responding to terrorism Across the Technological 
Spectrum," who summarized the data from The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism 
36 "[T]errorists will not engage in overkill if their traditional weapons - the submachine gun and the 
conventional bomb - are sufficient to continue the struggle and achieve their aims." Walter Laqueur, 
"Postmodern Terrorism," p. 31 
37 Jerrold Post, "Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations and Constraints," Preventing 
Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander, (Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 91-103 & 
Joseph Pilat, "Prospects for NBC Terrorism after Tokyo," Terrorism with Chemical and biological 
29 
the motives of terrorists tend to transition away from politics and toward religion, the 
potential for a WMD attack increases significantly.38 As mentioned previously, many 
religious-based terrorists regard their operations as an act of war that is blessed and 
justified by divine right. In execution of this "holy war," the use of any weapon, 
regardless of destructive capability, is viewed as appropriate. 
While the religiously motivated terrorist may be more likely to carry out a WMD 
attack, WMD uS,e by political actors can not be ruled out. Circumstances may arise in 
which these political terrorists find the employment of a WMD a completely rational and 
justified act. The ability to justify this action is largely determined by group psychology39 
and is impelled by the belief that the group's honor is at stake. This preserving or 
redeeming of "honor" may involve the desire to punish or seek revenge for believed 
misconduct. 
While a terrorist group may utilize a WMD on its own behalf, an even greater fear 
is such use in the interest of a state actor. This scenario can be easily envisioned, for . 
example, if Saddam Hussein were to feel that his fall from power was imminent. Another 
significant threat of a terrorist use of a WMD is its employment as a means of last resort. 
This is analyzed in a later chapter dealing with the danger of escalation. An additional 
threat that requires US attention is the potential use of a' WMD for extortion purposes. 
Weapons: Calibrating Risk and Response, ed. Brad Roberts, The Chemical and Biological Anns Control 
Institute, Alexandria V A 
38 "During the past decade, for example, religious terrorists or members of various religious "cults" have 
come closest to crossing the threshold of terrorist use ofa bonafide weapons of mass destruction." 
Hoffman, "Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum," p. 346 
39 Jerrold Post, "Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism" & Martha Crenshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism: 
Psychological Constraints 6n Instrumental Reasoning," International Social Movement Research, Vol. 4 
1992, pp. 29-42 
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The ability to hold an ~ntire city for ransom may be quite appealing to certain individuals 
or groupS.40 
Other factors, regardless of terrorist motivation, make concern about WMD attack 
necessary. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent degradation of security 
over its vast nuclear arsenal has virtually ensured the proliferation of nuclear material. 
Aside from nuclear material, the growing knowledge necessary to create chemical and 
biological weapons is in its own right an extremely disconcerting situation. In contrast to 
plutonium, that can only be used for nuclear needs, many of the chemicals used to create 
chemical weapons are also used in everyday materials like plastics. Thus, adequate 
control and tracing of these chemicals is simply impossible. While the creation of 
chemical or biological weapons by either professional or amateur terrorists is a 
significant concern, the large, state-run chemical weapons plants present an even greater 
threat. This threat increases drastically when states have already supported the conduct of 
terrorist activity, as is seen in the case of Libya. While the employment of such weapons 
is seen to be extreniely difficult, as seen in the failed Tokyo subway attack, the 
knowledge gained from each failed attempt will improve the chances, u~timately, for a 
successful attack. 
The advent of the information age, with its high-speed computer technology, has 
created an abundance of new opportunities for both terrorists and criminals. These non-
state actors have quickly realized the advantages that these technologies are able to 
provide in the operational realm. Today's advanced computer systems provide the 
modem non-state actor with both targets as well as the weapons necessary to attack them. 
40 "In thinking about the possibilities of nuclear terrorism, it is importatlt to distinguish between the actual 
detonation of a device and the use of a device for extortion and influence. The constraints against the latter 
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The advent of netwar in the repertoire of terrorists and criminals has significantly 
escalated their ability to threaten US national security. For this discussion, netwar will be 
used to apply to conduding disruptive, destructive or manipulative acts on information 
and communications systems. While all three actions (disruption, destruction and 
manipulation) are appealing to groups of all three of the motivations discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter, there is a 'natural pairing of the two. 
Disruptive action in this context is defined as action which in itself does not cause 
physical damage or the loss of life. In this light, the disruptive technique of netwar is 
perhaps best suited to the needs of the political terrorist. Disruptive terrorist acts may 
include actions as simple as the spreading of a computer virus, or more significant acts 
like tampering with the control systems of commuter trains. Other disruptive acts could 
include: the implanting of an automatic link in the World Wide Web which visits the 
terrorist's home page and describes their plight and the injustices of the present 
government; the interception of satellite communications and the broadcast of 
propaganda over television and radios; or instilling uncertainty and fear in the world's 
financial markets by simply thr~atening or actually adjusting the prices of stocks and 
bonds. All these acts and many others would bring the terrorists, and thus their plight, 
worldwide attention while averting the need for any real physical damage. While these 
acts may have seemed farfetched a few years ago, they are legitimate threats today.41 
Netwar allows these terrorist groups to regulate the magnitude, proportion, and 
range of their actions to best suit their needs. Thus, the conduct of disruptive netwar may 
are significantly reduced ... " Jerrold Post, "Prospects of Nuclear Terrorism," p. 102 
41 "A Nation at Risk, President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection." Hearing before US 
Congress, Committee on the Judiciary Subcommitte on Technology, Terrorism, and Government 
Information, Nov 5,1997. 
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· initially save lives, since the terrorists have gained other ways of achieving desired 
attention. However, as the need for bigger and more spectacular acts becomes necessary, 
to grab media and public attention, more intense and alarming disruptive action may be 
performed. Inevitably, some of these politically motivated terrorists will feel compelled 
to resort to violent action. When this point comes, the conduct of netwar allows for an 
easy transition to destructive techniques. 
The destructive technique of netwar is best suited to groups that desire to inflict 
casualties and physical damage without concern for their "image." As mentioned above, 
these are the groups that see their struggle as a form of warfare. Thus the religiously 
motivated terrorists are best suited, although by no means limited, to the use of the 
destructive capabilities of netwar. The destructive form of netwar utilizes the same basic 
principle as the disruptive technique but targets systems whose collapse or damage would 
create injury, structural ruin or death. Some potential destructive acts could include the 
intrusion into airfield computer systems in order to provide false landing information, or 
an assault on nuclear reactor control systems in the hopes of creating another ChernobyL 
The terrorists would only have to cut off power to Chicago in the middle of winter to 
potentially inflict hundreds of deaths. Many additional and even more horrific examples 
can be provided. The list is virtually boundless. 
Transnational criminal organizations are perhaps the biggest users of the 
manipulative capabilities of netwar. Manipulation, in this case, describes actions that are 
conducted for the benefit of the perpetrator without regard for their effect on outside 
parties. In other words, manipulative netwar, unlike the disruptive and destructive forms, 
is not necessarily performed to create an effect on a specific target. 
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The incredibly large daily volume of electronic data that is carried across 
information and communications systems has provided criminal enterprises two 
exceptional opportunities. Perhaps the more prevalent,is the ability of criminal 
organizations to hide their illegal transactions among the huge flows of legitimate 
activity.42 Transferring illegally obtained money was, at one point, a difficult process due 
to the sheer magnitude of money involved. Today, the same transactions can be 
completed many times over with the use of a computer. The ease with which criminal 
enterprises can launder money through use of advance computer systems is incredible. 
Money laundering today is estimated at $500 billion a year and is said to be the third 
largest business in the world.43 
The second opportunity, presented by netwar manipUlation, is the conduct of 
computer-based insurance schemes, fraud, and investment rackets. The U.S. Justice 
department estimates that computer based theft costs US businesses $10 million annually. 
Indeed, information technologies may be transforming the face of crime away from 
violent actions toward digital computer techniques. 
As advanced technologies and expertise become increasingly available, both 
terrorists and criminals will rely more heavily upon the conduct ofnetwar. Until recently, 
the realm of cyberspace was relegated to the major business corporations that were able 
to afford the expensive hardware and train or hire personnel capable of using it. Today, 
the exponential rate at which the power of personal computers has risen while the cost of 
owning one has plummeted, allows virtually every individual the opportunity to enter 
into the information realm. While the threat from individual "hackers" performing 
• 42 The UNDCP estimates that $ 1 billion of illicit capital moves through the worlds financial systems on a 
daily basis, United Nations International Drug Control Program, Drugs and Development, No.1, 1996 
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operations from their basement with a new Pentium II processor is a significant problem, 
the real threat to national security is felt from organizations that are able to purchase 
more powerful and capable information systems. As the tools to engage i~ netwar 
become increasingly available, the expertise needed to manipulate the systems continues 
to grow. These information and communications experts are being "homegrown" as well 
as being recruited from the best schools in the world. These non-state actors are willing to 
pay exceptional.salaries to individuals possessing these skills and, once the job is 
accepted, the option to resign does not exist. In addition to computer experts, former 
intelligence professionals from organizations like the KGB have been employed to serve 
terrorist and criminal needs. 
In addition to the increased offensive capabilities, netwar provides the non-state 
actor with numerous defensive benefits, including the decreased likelihood of 
apprehension. Perhaps the greatest defensive benefit to utilizing netwar is the lack of 
physical presence necessary to conduct the act. This distinct quality of cyberspace allows 
the terrorist or criminal to conduct operations in foreign countries around the world. As 
mentioned in a later chapter, these non-state actors take full advantage of the difficulties 
that face law enforcement in establishing jurisdiction. While these difficulties may be 
alleviated through administrative measures, the abilities of netwar render establishing a 
point of origin a tremendous problem in itself. As the information super-highway 
continues to expand, the ability to detect and trace the origins of any single transaction or 
process becomes extremely problematic, if not impossible.44 This dilemma becomes 
increasingly more significant when the use of encryption is applied. While the US has 
43 Kerry, The New War, p.150 
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maintained the belief that powerful encryption should not be disseminated4S, the 
criminals and terrorists are already employing unbreakable encryption capabilities. Thus, 
while illegal organizations are able to safeguard their transactions, the legitimate 
businesses that are in danger from these groups are not allowed to do so. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Terrorism and crime are continuously evolving in an attempt to keep pace with 
societal changes and technological innovation. Terrorism, once thought to be solely 
political in nature, has found additional motivations, the greatest of which are religion 
and money. The expanded range of terrorist motivations and the increased cooperation 
between terrorist and criminal organizations has produced an exceptionally potent threat 
to US security. To add to the rising dilemma, these non-state actors have shown an 
attraction to and proficiency with advanced communications and intelligence systems. 
These technologies have precipitated the transformation seen in today's terrorist and 
criminal organizations. The rise of "amateur terrorists" from a trivial level to a serious 
concern can be substantially attributed to the ability of the Internet to put out "the word." 
The unprecedented ease of international travel and the security in long-distance 
communications have greatly facilitated the conduct of international terrorism and crime. 
Perhaps the greatest employment of advanced intelligence systems has been in 
organizational restructuring. The trend toward networked designs has already displayed 
44 The effect that encryption has on law enforcement capabilities is discussed by Louise Shelley, "Crime 
and Corruption in the Digital Age," Journal of International affairs, Spring 1998 
4S A discussion on the dilemma the government faces on encryption issues is presented in Kerry, The New 
War, pp. 131-132 
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its ability to produce more efficient and effective terror and criminal organizations. In 
addition to the administrative characteristics, advanced technologies have provided these 
non-state actors with an extremely powerful weapon in the form of netwar, and an 
extremely target rich environment. Terrorists and criminals have adapted notably well to 
the information age, and in so doing pose a severe threat to American National Security. 
The US can no longer afford to regard these groups as a secondary threat which has 
traditionally taken a back seat to state actors. While in the past these threats may have 
been considered an inconvenience or a minor security concern, today they pose the most 
active and uncertain threat to the US and its interests. 
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III. CONTRASTING STRATEGIES 
To confront the significant problems of terrorism and transnational crime, a wide 
range of tactics are available. While these tactics can be bundled together in a variety of 
ways to develop a wide range of overall strategies, they basically fall into two categories. 
These two distinct and fundamentally opposite categories are: reactive and proactive 
approaches to counter terrorism and crime. The reactive strategy is composed of four 
tactical groupings: prosecution, administrative measures, defensive measures and military 
action.46 The proactive approach emphasizes the use of information operations in the 
conduct of disruptive and destructive acts. 
Current US efforts to combat these growing security concerns are focused on 
reactive measures. The US policies of prosecution, no concessions, treaties, defensive 
posturing and sanctions are all tactics that allow the terrorist or criminal entity to retain 
the initiative. The objective of these tactics is to persuade, through indirect (and thus 
ineffective) pressure, the cessation of illicit activity. Even the seemingly aggressive use of 
military strikes, as was seen with the Tomahawk attack on the Bin Laden organization, in 
the manner currently employed, falls into the guidelines of a reactive strategy. Proof of 
the current US reactive strategy's ineffectiveness can be seen by the continued booming 
criminal industry and the recent domestic and overseas terrorist attacks. 
46 David Tucker in his article "Responding to Terrorism," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1998, 
discusses 9 methods the US uses to respond to terrorism. This paper combines four of these methods: 
negotiating treaties and conventions, addressing terrorism causes, economic sanctions and policy of no 
concessions, into a single heading termed administrative measures. When addressing the two proactive 
measures of disruption and preemption, the US has, with limited exceptions, ignored their practice. The 
State Department's Patterns o/Global Terrorism,1997, April 1998, only addresses three tactics; no 
concessions, prosecution and treaties, and conventions. 
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In order to combat and ultimately eliminate these groups as a significant threat, a 
more effective strategy is needed. A proactive approach with an emphasis on (IO) has the 
potential to provide this effectiveness. Through attacks, primarily non-lethal, at all levels 
of terrorist and criminal operations, the US can sufficiently deteriorate these groups' 
capabilities and reduce their appetite to continue operations. While the proactive 
approach provides a significantly more effective strategy for combating these threats, it 
also presents new and non-trivial costs. However, when analyzed against the costs of the 
current US reactive strategy, it is observed that these "new" costs are minimal and, over a 
short period of time, will present the US with significant "total" savings. A complete cost 
comparison analysis is conducted in the next chapter. 
A. REACTIVE STRATEGY 
The tactics employed by the current US reactive strategy are intended to influence 
the terrorists or criminals to cease operations, but do little to restrain terrorist and criminal 
options. Under these tactics, the terrorist/criminal is allowed the option to continue 
activity as normal, delay operations until pressure subsides, or, as the US hopes, 
terminate operations all together. The problem in this process is that it is the terrorist or 
criminal himself that currently gets to make this choice. This freedom to determine their 
own conduct cedes them the critical initiative and forces the US into a reactive posture. 
The first component of current US efforts is the policy of prosecution. 
Prosecution, in this context, is the US government's ~ffort to present the perpetrators of 
such action in front of judge and jury in the hopes of convicting and sentencing them. 
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Perhaps the most significant flaw in this tactic is that it is employed only after a terrorist 
act or criminal activity has been performed. Successful conduct of this tactic first requires 
knowledge of who performed the act, then to bring the individual or group into custody, 
then finally to convict them in a court oflaw. Not only does this tactic incur significant 
cost in both manpower and funding, it does nothing to prevent future action. Proponents 
of this policy argue that the example set by successfully convicting and subsequently 
incarcerating or even putting to death, these individuals will provide effective warning to 
future perpetrators. While this may be accurate in the case of the "wishy washy" terrorist, 
it has virtually no effect upon the religious zealot, the individual who sees himself as a 
martyr, nor the individual who believes he will not get caught. A terrorist who is willing 
to die in the conduct of his attack will not be swayed by the threat of a death penalty that 
will inevitably take years to carry out. When dealing with crime, the threa~ of 
incarceration seems minuscule as compared with the potentially huge payoff of 
successful operations .. 
Prosecution carries numerous additional difficulties to include extradition 
procedures and sovereignty law applicability. While attempts at resolving these 
difficulties are performed through administrative measures, as discussed below, terrorists 
and criminals are exploiting and hiding behind these problems to the fullest extent. 
In addition to the difficulties of effecting such a tactic comes the potential that the 
perpetrators may be able, through 'skillful legal representation, to manipulate or abuse the 
US's legal system. The ramifications of such a scenario, in which an acquittal is 
delivered, would be devastating to future counter efforts and would significantly 
encourage rather than deter future action. The prospects for such a scenario are not too 
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remote when one realizes the monetary resources available to many of these 
organizations. 
The US government currently relies heavily upon administrative measures to 
combat terrorism and crime. The primary administrative vehicles utilized by the US are 
international treaties, conventions and economic sanctions. While these tactics have their 
place within any complete strategy, they are rarely very effective as a method of directly 
combating terror' and crime. These administrative measures may in fact facilitate the 
prosecution procedure. However that tactic, as discussed above has problems of its own. 
While treaties, sanctions and international agreements played a significant role in 
curtailing terrorism in the 1970s and '80s, they have proven of limited value in the post 
cold war era.47 Unlike the terrorist of the '80s, today's terrorist organizations are not as 
controlled or influenced by foreign state actors. While numerous rogue states still support 
terrorist organizations, some more covertly than others, they are either unconcerned with 
world opinion or are sufficiently economically and politically leveraged with other UN 
countries as to ensure their continued vitality.48 When deniability or simple non-
compliance with these treaties is in a state's best interests, economically or politically, it 
simply ignores them, as was seen in France in 1994.49 . 
47 "As has now been revealed in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Communism in 1989, most of the 
international terror that plagued the world from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s was the product of an 
ad hoc aIliance between the Soviet bloc and dictatorial Arab regimes." Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism, 
p.53 
48 In 1996 French businesses disregarded US Congressional passed laws aimed at preventing foreign 
investment by threatening sanctions, by investing 2 biJIion in Iranian oil fields. 
49 In January 1994 the French Prime Minister released Iranian suspected terrorists wanted by Switzerland. 
Sharon Waxman, "France's Release ofIranians Triggers Swiss Complaint," Washington Post, January I, 
1994, p. AI5 
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The reduced importance of administrative tactics can also be explained by the 
significant shift seen in terrorist motives. 50 This shift is away from the earlier period of 
politically-based terror and toward religious and economic terror. The goals of the 
political terrorist required that they take into consideration the effect their actions would 
have on external opinion. In fact, many of their acts were conducted for the very purpose 
of affecting foreign opinion. On the other hand, economically motivated terrorists 
escalate their tactics as necessary to ensure ~heir monetary prosperity. The religious 
terrorist sees himself as fighting a holy war in which the external influences themselves 
are often what they are fighting. This religious motive demands additional scrutiny and 
concern, since their goal may very well have limitless destructive intentions. 
The introduction of cyberterror and crime plays havoc with and virtually renders 
impotent a number of current US reactive tactics.51 The nature of cyberspace, which is 
borderless, or conceptually non-existent in the geographic sense, virtually eliminates or at 
a minimum signifi~antly confuses the effectiveness of international treaties. While the 
laws within the US are having a difficult time getting a handle on this "new" instrument 
of terror and crime, the majority of other countries haven't even addressed this problem.52 
Thus the difficulties in determining jurisdiction and which nation's law to apply, if 
indeed they have laws of this nature, are immense. 
50 Medd, & Goldstein, "International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium" 
51 While the definition of terrorism is itself a difficult matter, cyberterror or information terrorism is even 
more so. Martin C. Libicki in his essay, What is Information Warfare?, (The Center for Advanced 
Concepts and Technology, 1995), pp. 75-77, defines it in very narrow terms as a subset of computer 
hacking. Cyberterror, viewed in a much broader form and possessing significantly greater consequences, is 
presented in a short story by John Arquilla in Wired magazine, Feb 1998. 
52 A discussion on the legal aspects of Information Warfare is provided in Richard Aldrich, The 
International Legal Implications of Information Waifare, (Colorado Springs: Institute for National Security 
Studies, 1996) 
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The US use of administrative measures to fight international terrorism has many 
shortfalls. However, when dealing with domestic terrorism, the US wisely structured its 
laws and law enforcement offices to avoid many of these same problems. Designating 
terrorism as a federal offense, vise a local or state offense, solved both jurisdiction and 
law applicability issues. The Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, by federal law, possesses 
jurisdiction ove'r all domestic terrorist acts. 53 Thus, unlike in the international realm, 
administrative turf battles are a much less powerful factor in domestic affairs. 
While the use of administrative measures is seen to have a limited effect upon 
international terror, it bestows even less upon the transnational criminals. A primary , 
reason for this ineffectiveness is the inability of many foreign governments to exert any 
measure of control or significantly combat these organizations within their own territory. 
Relatively few foreign countries, from which these criminal organizations ,originate, 
possess a proficient police force capable of performing sufficient law enforcement. This 
is most drastically seen in, Colombia, and more recently in Russia. Thus, while states 
themselves may be more than willing to cooperate with international agreements, they are 
unfortunately often incapable of doing so. 
At the other extreme of criminal-state relationships, are countries that benefit from 
criminal activity. These are the countries that provide secure banking facilities for 
criminal organizations to launder their money. In many of these countries, official secrecy 
of offshore financial centers is written into law4thus preventing cooperation in 
S3 GAO report, "Combating Terrorism," Sep 97, Federal agencies efforts to implement national policy and 
strategy 
S4 Kerry, The New War, p. 155 
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international agreements. Perhaps the most notable case of this government/criminal 
cooperation was seen in Panama under Manuel Noriega.55 
While the ability of some foreign governments to prevent criminal action may be 
severally limited, cooperation treaties have shown the potential to improve world law 
enforcement efforts. The agreements to allow FBI agents in foreign countries to advice 
and work in cooperation with foreign government police forces is a step in the right 
direction. 56 While this cooperation has produced some successes, the decline in total 
criminal activity produced from these successes is literally non-existent. The reason for 
this poor result is the inability of even combined efforts to significantly penetrate the 
numerous criminal organizations. 
The third tactic within the current US reactive strategy is reducing vulnerabilities 
through increased defensive measures, awareness and training. Perhaps the most visible 
effect of this reactive strategy, and a fairly symbolic one, is the ever increasing emphasis· 
. on hardening overseas facilities·. 57 Through the implementation of crash walls, multi-
tiered wiring, security gates and numerous and varied sensors and detectors, the US has 
attempted to insulate i~self from terrorist attack. This tactic fails in two respects: one, it . 
doesn't work; and two, it imprisons the wrong people. Regardless of the amount of 
SS "Using the Panamanian banks, dictator Manuel Noriega created a civil regime indistinguishable from a 
global criminal gang, where the state and its bankers sponsored drug and arms trafficking and prostitution, 
as well as engaging in money laundering and tax evasion," Kerry, p. 157 
S6 FBI director Louis J. Freeh, discusses the successes of current and planned cooperation agreements 
bei:w~en his agency and numerous foreign police forces in front of the committee on Internationai 
Relations of the House of Representatives Oct. 1, 1997 
S7 It is difficult to determine the exact spending levels of government agencies on anti-terrorist activity. 
This is true due to the definitional problems, agencies tend to include anti-terror expenses into larger 
categories, and agencies are not required to account separately for their terrorist related programs and 
activities. However, as described in the GAO report GAO/NSIAD-97-207, "CombatiIig Terrorism, DOD 
efforts to protect its forces overseas," Jul 97, the DOD estimates that it spends over 4 billion dollars 
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defensive structuring, terrorists have always been able either to find the weak point, or 
simply to find a more vulnerable target. As the US enhances defenses around military 
bases and embassies, terrorists have shown a trend to target US business personnel, 
individuals on vacation or private businesses that are associated with the US or the 
American way of life. S8 Perhaps an even more alarming prospectus is that the 
implementation of these point defenses may drive terrorists to stand-off weaponry and 
increasingly more powerful explosives. This weaponry may include the use of biological 
and chemical agents as well as nuclear devices. In addition to the inherent ineffectiveness 
of defensive measures, the heavier security procedures significantly hamper and 
inconvenience the personnel they are intended to protect. 
The second component to this tactic consists of educating high-risk personnel as 
to the level and type of threat, and subsequently training them how to avoid being a 
target. S9 The US has spent significant effort and money to better inform and train its 
overseas personnel in hopes of minimizing vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. Regardless 
of the extent and efficiency of this training, terrorist acts will continue to occur. 
Terrorists committed to carrying out their attacks will inevitably find a fatal flaw.60 
Terrorists have the lUXUry of being patient and waiting for their targets to make a slip. In 
addition, terrorists are generally afforded the time to reconnoiter numerous potential 
combating terrorism. The same report states that while security improvements have been made, significant 
vulnerabilities still remain. 
58 104 out of 126 terrorist attacks in 1996 targeted business personnel, "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 
1997", United States Department of State, April 1998 
59 As stated in GAOfNSIAD-97-207, DOD's antiterrorism Program, "DOD has mandated more robust 
antiterrorism training for personnel deploying to medium to high threat countries. The training is intended 
to increase awareness of the threat and provide information on individual protection measures." 
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targets and simply pick and choose who and when. While training and education may 
cause the terrorist to extend considerably more effort than would have otherwise been 
needed, it does not inhibit performance. 
In the criminal arena, government programs to educate the American populace on 
the detrimental effects of crime have done little in the way of curtailing activity or 
limiting victims. T~e government's largest effort in this area has dealt with the use and 
distribution of illegal drug,s. 61 While this is a noble endeavor it has proven to have a 
limited effectivenes~. Criminal organizations have developed new marketing schemes, 
including introduction of drugs to very young children, and the introduction of highly 
addictive drugS.62 These criminal efforts have outpaced the government's education and 
prevention efforts. 
While the drug trade is one of the more prevalent criminal enterprises, it is 
definitely not the only one. In the areas of smuggling, racketeering, prostitution, fraud, 
etc., efforts in education and awareness are minimal, and are seen to provide extremely 
limited defense. Many times, the only education provided to the American people is on 
popular news shows like Dateline or 20120. The primary reason for this lack of 
government concern is that crimes like mail fraud and insurance scams are not seen as a 
serious threat. 
60 An excellent example is Col. James Rowe, who, as an Army Special Forces Officer, had received some 
of the best training in this area, yet on April 21, 1989, he was ambushed and killed by the Philippine "New 
Peoples Army" while traveling to work outside Manila, 
61 The President requested 1,916.5 billion dollars in fy98 for drug prevention efforts, and 3.003 billion for 
treatment, "The National Drug Control Strategy, 1997: Budget summary", The White House, Feb 97 
62 Use of illicit drugs among 8th graders is up more than 150% over the past 5 years. "The National Drug 
Control Strategy" 
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The final reactive tactic utilized by the US is the performance of limited military 
strikes against suspected terrorist camps and facilities. While this tactic may initially look 
like a very aggressive proactive measure, deeper analysis reveals its true reactive nature. 
The primary goal of these operations is to persuade terrorists and state sponsors to cease 
further operations. As stated previously, this is a reactive goal that leaves the option, and 
thus the initiative, in the hands of the terrorists. As discussed further below, the US has 
only used this tactic to punjsh terrorist organizations for actions that have already been 
committed and lives already lost. It seems that the current US position adopts this 
reactive stance in the hope that the eventual counter attack will seem more justified. 
While these military strikes grab headlines, the actual benefit of such action is 
arguable. Successful strikes have the potential to completely destroy and iI?-capacitate 
terrorist training camps and facilities, but the damage incurred is primarily structural and 
quite easily replaced. Additionally, if the strike does not completely destroy the terrorist's 
capability and the will to perforin further operations, the desire for retribution will be 
enormous. With the trend toward more powerful weaponry, including WMDs, retribution 
for such an attack may, be excessive. The US government may also incur enormous costs 
in world opinion. While the domestic constituency will normally see this action as 
appropriate andjustified,63 the world opinion may not be so friendly and potentially may 
be less willing to cooperate with the US on future matters.64 
63 The strikes on the Bin Laden terrorist facilities had the support of 3 out of 4 Americans. "The military 
strikes have boosted Clinton's political standing and public confidence in his ability to function as 
, President", LA Times Aug 23 1998. 
64 For example, the strikes on Bin Laden's facilities were condemned by most Arab countries and by 
Russian Pressident Boris Yeltsin. 
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While the use of military strikes has historically been quite limited, two attacks 
have occurred in response to terrorist action. These cases are the air raid on Libya in 1986 
and the 1998 Tomahawk strikes on the Bin Laden terrorist facilities. Both strikes were 
retaliatory in nature, performed in response to successful terrorist attacks. While the long-
term results ofthis most recent strike are still to be determined, the Libyan results can 
now be sufficiently analyzed. 
While the two strikes seem to be similar in nature there are two distinct 
differences that need to be addressed. In 1986 the US attacked facilities that were owned 
and operated by the state of Libya itself. In 1998 the strikes targeted facilities that were 
run by a non-state organization within the territorial boundaries of two countries. 
Striking a state itself is significantly less complicated than attacking an organization 
within a state. When striking a state entity, violation of sovereignty is not an issue, 
because it is the state itself that is the target. When striking a non-state player within the 
territory of other states, the violation of sovereignty becomes a very significant issue. 
The second significant difference between the 1986 and 1998 strikes, is the 
accuracy of weapons used by the US. In 1986, the delivery methods and weapons 
accuracy virtually insured that damage would be inflicted upon unplanned targets. 
However, as mentioned above, since the target was the state itself, this collateral damage 
was much more palatable. In 1998, the pinpoint accuracy of the weaponry was critical, 
especially within the urban area of Khartoun, in Sudan. Any level of collateral damage 
during this strike would have brought significantly more pressure and admonition from 
world opinion. 
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The conduct of military strikes, and thus the threat of future strikes, is more 
effective as an instrument of deterrence when dealing with state actors such as Libya. 
This is true because Libya, as a country, can not pick up and,move underground. It is 
always exposed to attack. Non-state actors such as Bin Laden have the luxury of mobility 
and elusiveness: Because of these factors, non-state actors are significantly harder to deter 
with conventional military strikes. Even in the case of Libya the success at deterrence is 
arguable, with terrorism having eventually re~urned to normal in the aftennath of Pan Am 
flight 103.65 
Analyzing the use of lethal force against criminal organizations requires drawing 
a distinction between domestically-located and foreign-based strikes. On the domestic 
side, law enforcement is severely constrained by US law and a reluctance to use force due 
to social disapproval in this country. In addition, striking at the domestic aspect of 
international crime is similar to cutting off the tail of a skink, in which the lost appendage 
only grows back str~nger. Combating crime overseas requires cooperation with the host 
nation, and very rarely involves actual force by US entities. 
The US reactive strategy to terronsm and crime is clearly inappropriate in today's 
high risk, technologically advanced environment. Incorporating this reactive strategy 
allows the terrorist or criminal to retain the initiative. With this initiative, they are able to 
innovate around current US efforts aimed at stopping them, and are allowed great 
freedom of maneuver. Terrorists are able to plan, recruit, and solicit support with virtually 
no fear of reprisal or intervention until after lives are lost. Criminal organizations are 
laughing all the way to the bank while undennining American society. 
6S Tucker, "Responding to Terrorism," p.lll 
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Thus, a significantly more aggressive and effective method is required. The 
advent of information operations has presented the US with the weapon it so vitally 
needs, not only to combat but to win the war against both terrorism and crime. 10, 
utilized within a proactive strategy has the capability to confront and attack these groups 
at their most vulnerable points. This proactive strategy will keep the terrorists and 
criminals on the defensive, forcing them to fear for their very existence and take away 
their ability to plan, and perform operations. While the proactive strategy takes a more 
aggressive approach, it does not abandon the tactics employed in the reactive strategy. 
The proactive strategy takes full advantage and utilizes all tactics available including the 
more administrative and reactive ones described above. 
B. PROACTIVE STRATEGY 
Although the proactive strategy retains many reactive tactics, it relies more 
heavily upon the two tactics of preemption, and disruption. Both are critically reliant 
upon accurate, precise and timely information. 10 is thus a two-pronged instrument. The 
first prong provides one of the more important weapons in the actual conduct of 
operations. The second provides the tools necessary to gain the information that is 
required to properly utilize these weapons. 
Preemption is the conduct of direct offensive action utilized to disable a terrorist 
or criminal organization's ability to perform a specific act or operation. The preemptive 
tactic can be equally effective against terrorists and criminals. However it is within the 
terrorist realm that the greater benefits are possible. This is true due to the potential 
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impact of a successful operation from a terrorist attack, versus the completion of a 
criminal operation. This point becomes abundantly clear when the concept of a terrorist's 
use of a WMD is considered. 
Unlike the responsive military strike, the preemptive tactic is performed in 
expectation of a terrorist act. Thus, the US heads off the attacker, beating him to the 
punch, and subsequently averts the loss of innocent life. The use of preemptive measures 
eliminates the controversy behind responsive proportionality by creating conditions that 
force the abandonment of terrorist operations. In addition, the preemptive tactic utilizing 
10, is much better suited to combat cyberterror, allowing the US to confront the terrorist 
at the same level, with the same and even better weapons. 
In the context of terrorist activity, the preemptive tactic has many applications, all 
of which rely upon the knowledge of highly specific details. The creation of this 
condition can be accomplished in numerous ways, the .specifics of which are explained in 
chapter 5, and only lightly touched upon here to help delineate the proactive strategy. It is 
important to note that many of these actions can be very effective without their 
employment being broadcast, or the loss of life being necessary on either side. 
Performing these operations clandestinely, and performing them in such a way that the 
terrorists do not even realize that they are being targeted, diminishes the threat of 
retributive attacks that are so prevalent with traditional military strikes. 
Terrorist activity is inherently time sensitive. Any delay in any phase of the 
operation can throw off the timing so that the entire plan must be abandoned. The use of 
10 can create such delays in numerous ways. Knowing terrorists' intended travel and 
movement plans will allow the ability to prevent or delay such movement. The 
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cancellation of airline tickets or the flagging of passports can prevent travel or entry into 
or out of-a country. Detaining or arresting personnel for necessary time periods, for 
virtually any reason to include loitering, can force them to miss their window of 
opportunity. A tactic as simple as informing the terrorists that we know of their plans, 
down to critical details would have a sufficient effect to warrant their cancellation. More 
active measures such as jamming communications, or entering into their intelligence 
network, can provide enormous opportunities. The impersonation of terrorist leadership 
that gives conflicting orders, or simply calls off the operation, can avert disaster. 
Tampering with equipment, including the weapons themselves as well as 
communications, vehicles, and money supply can all disrupt terror. Overt police 
presence, which virtually shadows the potential perpetrators, may make them realize the . 
futility of their plans. These techniques, along with numerous other psychological 
operations, and even the occasional use of limited force, may both convince and prevent 
the terrorist from acting. 
The tactic of disruption attacks terrorists and criminals at their origin, affecting 
their ability to plan coordinate and carry out future operations. This tactic is truly the core 
of the proactive strategy, taking the fight to the terrorists and criminals, placing them on 
the defensive. These disruptive measures, which focus on 10, have the ability to affect 
the terrorist or criminal organization at three levels: the international/state level, the 
organizational level and the individual level. 
At the international level, the emphasis is upon disrupting sponsor and 
cooperative relationships in an effort to isolate and or alienate the terrorist or criminal 
organization. Many terrorist organizations rely, in some degree, upon the support or at a 
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minimum, the indifference of a state entity. This support allows the terrorists to organize 
and train behind the relative safety of state protection. In return, these organizations 
provide the state with a potential tool for clandestinely carrying out desired goals. While 
occasional exceptions have occurred, like the recent Sudan and Afghanistan strikes, US 
resolve to reach out and strike these targets in foreign territory is very limited. As 
mentioned above, the actual lasting benefit from these types of overt attacks is highly 
arguable. In addition, the potential lack of support from Congress is always a concern, 
and has the potential, to cause political turmoil. Knowing these drawbacks, terrorists 
groups continue to rely heavily upon these support relationships. The use of disruptive 
10 techniques to erode this relationship, and subsequently to force these organizations to 
seek new "homes" avoids these problems and can significantly enhance counter terrorist 
efforts. 
With respect to international crime, the criminal organIzations do not seek this 
same tYpe of relationship with state sponsors. Instead, criminal organizations take 
advantage of a weak state's inability to prevent their continued operations. While these 
foreign states may prefer to expel these groups, they are often incapable of doing so. 
Because these states are sovereign entities and possess national pride and political ideals, 
they will not allow unilateral US operations within their country. Thus, criminal 
organizations benefit from the same "safe haven" concept as the terrorist organizations. 
While progress has been made in the area of cooperative police activity, it is still 
significantly hampered by cultural and capability variations between the US and others. 
In addition, some state's offices and officials, as exemplified by Colombia and Russia, 
have become sufficiently corrupted and controlled by these criminal groups that 
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cooperation with US is severely hampered. Because of this relationship in which the 
criminal organization virtually forces its will upon the state, disruptive 10 techniques are 
limited, but by no means useless. 
While cooperation between states and criminal organizations may be actually 
weakening in some cases, the cooperation between criminal organizations themselves is 
growing stronger.66 This inter-organizational cooperation, while posing a potent threat to 
the US, also opens up new vulnerabilities. A full discussion describing the capabilities of 
disruptive techniques is provided in a later chapter and only briefly mentioned here. 
The goal of disruptive 10 methods is to. erode this support and cooperation. This 
can be performed in myriad of ways, limited only by one's imagination. One disruptive 
technique at this level could be the interception of monetary support or equipment 
transactions through computer systems. Providing the terrorist group with, significantly 
less money, or no money at all, can quickly cause dissension. The planting of information 
which would indicate betrayal by the government, or the reverse, in which the terrorist 
organization that would conduct operations against its supporters can drive a wedge 
between entities. In the case of Arab-based terrorism, the false dissemination of 
information, or even doctored video depicting the group conducting acts that go against 
their religion, can quickly cost the group constituency support. Between criminal 
organizations, simply the belief that one organization has cheated the other will quickly 
cause a break in cooperation if not a "war." These and many other concepts are discussed 
in greater detail later. 
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The next level of disruptive operations is organizational. Both terrorist and 
criminal organizations are greatly affected by and reliant upon group dynamics. These 
group dynamics are centered on interpersonal relationships,67 reputations, power, and ego. 
Due to the nature of both terrorism and crime, loyalty and trust are critical aspects of 
maintaining group cohesion. 
The objective of disruptive 10 would be to chip away at these areas with the effect 
of critically damaging these bonds. Artificially instilling paranoia into leadership levels 
can achieve this erosion, calling into question the loyalty and trust of groul' members. 
Inserting misinformation that would create an internal belief in a challenge for leadership 
can quickly cause dissension, factionalism, or even a "civil war."The leaking of 
information, although potentially false, that would seriously bring into question 
leadership ability or authentication of objectives, could reduce loyalties, support and 
future recruitment.68 Perhaps an even greater effect on recruitment and retention can be 
accomplished through embarrassing the organization in the eyes of its constituency.69 
Once again fostering the belief of embezzlement or theft from one another has the 
potential to cause huge internal conflicts. Numerous other techniques are discussed later, 
but the key to all methods is to keep these organizations sufficiently busy with internal 
turmoil so that their operations become inefficient, and potentially cease altogether. 
66 "Not only have the Chinese become the world leaders in trafficking in heroin and fake credit cards, they 
have also sealed alliances with the Japanese Yakuza, the Russian Mafia, and the Colombian cartels through 
their expatriate network." Kerry, The New War, p. 64 
67 Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," Orbis Volume 
29, number 3, Fall 1985, p.474 
68 Jerrold M Post, "Narcissism and the Charismatic leader-follower Relationship," Political Psychology, 
Vol 7, N04, 1986 p.676 
69 Directly effects the incentive of Social Status as described by Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach 
to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," Orb is p.478 
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The remaining level of disruption is at the individual level. This approach plays 
significantly on psychological operations, and can be broken into two general categories. 
The first targets a specific individual and is aimed at directly influencing hislher actions. 
The second utilizes and manipulates one individual to influence the actions of others. 
Targeting an individual is intended to change his actions, beliefs, and desires. This 
includes the potential use of subliminal messages, in which the individual is continuously 
bombarded with subconscjous images favorable to US desires. While the use of bribes, 
blackmail, and threats may also influence the individual into "seeing things our way," 
they probably have limited effectiveness with terrorists and criminals and have a high 
probability of backfiring. 
The second category provides a dual benefit. First it takes the spe~ific individual 
out of the picture, but more importantly it influences other individuals, the existence of 
which may not even be known. The two primary operations within this category are 
"snatches" (also known as arrests) and "extermination." While a trend toward networking 
has become evident (see chapter 4), some terrorist and criminal organizations are still 
centered around a fe~ key individuals. In some cases it is the individual himself that 
keeps the organization alive by providing both the practical functioning structure as well 
as a spiritual idealistic leadership. Once an individual of this nature is abducted, 
significant image manipulation can be performed so as to alienate his constituency. This 
was seen to be the case with the Shining Path in Peru, in which the organization for all 
intents and purposes deteriorated after Guzman was captured and imprisoned. The 
Peruvian government, under President Fujimoros direction, enhanced this success by 
disseminating images ~d messages of an imprisoned and spiritually beaten Somosa . The 
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same principle can be seen in the case of criminal activity with the killing of Pablo 
Escobar, after which the Medellin cartel lost its prominent position to the more refined 
Cali cartel. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In 1997, there were 123 anti-US terrorist incidents.7o The drug trade alone has 
accounted for over 16,000 American lives and cost taxpayers over 17 billion annually7]. 
Clearly, US efforts to combat these serioll:S security threats have been inadequate. A 
strategy in which America dictates the moves and attacks at the core of these phenomena 
is now within our capabilities. This proactive strategy focuses on the use ofIO and strikes 
these groups at the three levels where they are most vulnerable. By adopting this 
unconventional approach to terrorism and crime, we could erode the "comfort zone" that 
terrorists and criminals now enjoy. Terrorism and crime are becoming an ever-increasing 
security issue. The US must implement this strategy and effectively reduce or eliminate 
these phenomena. 
70 "Patterns of Global Terrorism" 
71 National Drug Control Strategy 
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IV. COST OF DOING BUSINESS 
With any proposed strategy, there are two key factors that inevitably determine its 
acceptance or rejection. These factors are effectiveness and cost. The first factor was the 
topic of chapter three; the second is dealt with herein. 
Implementation of any strategy, regardless of its goal, will inevitably generate an 
inherent cost through the expenditure of some asset. This expense or cost can take myriad 
forms. Perhaps the most common expense is monetary or economic. This concept of cost 
applies whether one is buying a pair of shoes or fighting a war. In either case, the 
expenditure of resources is required. The resource that is consumed does not have to be 
monetary or even a tangible asset. 
When dealing with counter terrorism and counter crime, the potential cost 
involved in any strategy is a critical factor in determining whether to implement it. If it 
were not, the US could simply conduct a nuclear strike into the heart of the Colombian 
drug cartel's cocaine production and eliminate it as a security concern. When sufficiently 
analyzed, the costs associated with carrying out such an action, (particularly the political 
costs) would undoubtedly outweigh the benefits. Thus, it is insufficient to focus solely on 
potential benefits of a given strategy. A proper analysis of the counter terror and crime 
strategies must heavily weigh the costs involved within each. 
Analyzing the costs associated with terrorism and transnational crime reveals 
seven major cost factors. These factors are discussed in detail below in order to provide a 
greater understanding of their individual effects upon the likelihood of strategy 
acceptance. This cost analysis will provide a general and plausible outline that can then 
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be tailored to any situation. The significance of any cost is a relative concept determined 
by the judgment of whoever conducts the analysis. In other words, the loss of a $100,000 
shipment of drugs may seem like a tremendous loss to the neighborhood drug dealer but 
is seen as inconsequential to the drug cartels.72 In addition, the risks posed by engaging a 
. particular strategy are included in the individual cost factors. 
Each of the seven cost factors below is analyzed with respect to current US 
reactive strategy and the proposed IO-based proactive strategy. In order to perform this 
analysis properly, the costs must be observed not at a specific time and point, but over a 
more extended time period. The reason for this requirement will become abundantly clear 
as the analysis is conducted. . 
After each of ~e cost factors is individually analyzed, a cost diagram depicting 
the aggregate cost of all seven factors will be constructed for both terrorism and crime. . 
The total cost difference between the reactive and proactive strategies can then best be 
observed. While there may inevitably be some bias as to the degree of significance of 
each cost factor, the principles and ideas that these costs are based upon remain relevant. 
In addition, the degree to which each of the strategies is implemented will affect each 
cost factor. In other words, the cost associated with any tactic will be in direct 
relationship to how aggressively that tactic is used. 
72 Annual turnover is estimated at $ 500 billion by the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), 
United Nations International Drug Control program, Drugs and Development, no. 1 (I 996) p.l 
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A. HUMAN LIFE 
The value of a single human life is a concept that will most likely never be agreed 
upon.73 Religious institutions like the Catholic Church will argue that human life is more 
important than any other issue- in essence, priceless. Governments, on the other hand, do 
not seem to value human life to the same degree. Even in democratic countries like the 
United States where human rights issues draw a large constituency, the value of life is, in 
practice, negotiable and varied. As proof of this belief, one need only look at the number 
of lives that have been lost in America's numerous wars and its embarrassing history of 
slavery. While governments tend to price life as less than of paramount importance, they 
are by no means the lowest bidders. The violence observed in inner city gang 
neighborhoods has shown virtually a complete disregard for human life. Gang initiations 
have included the blatant and random killing of innocent individuals whose only crime 
was being in the wrong place at the wrong time.74 This disdain for human life is not 
relegated to the US" alone, and numerous atrocities have and will continue to occur 
around the world. Perhaps the most horrific was the Jewish holocaust dpring World War 
Two. While the value oflife is hard to quantify, some criminal groups do attempt to place 
a monetary value on life as seen in the cases of indentured servants and kidnappings. 
73 In Pope John Paul II's 11th encyclical, Evangelium Vitae, titled "The Gospel of Life" March 251995, he 
calls the value of human life "inestimable." On the other hand, an OMS report drafted in the 1980s by 
accountant John MorraIl calculated the cost per life saved for various federal regulations. In essence 
placing a value upon human life. His estimates ranged from $100,000 to $72 billion. 
74 As an example of the sheer number of atrocities associated with gang initiations, the LexuslNexus 
research data base's search engine was overloaded by the number of newspaper reports on gang initiation 
violence even when limited to the past 90 days. In addition The Journal of American Medical Association, 
released a study in 1995 that charted an astonishing overaIl rise in gang murder, These murders accounted 
for 43% of all homicides within the Los Angeles area. 113 of these deaths involved individuals not 
associated with gang activity. 
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When attempting to justify US policy, the value of human life must be observed 
not at the individual level but at the state level. Thus while the loss of a loved one may be 
devastating on the personal level, it can be less consequential at the level of the state. The 
cost of human life at this level of analysis is affected by several factors, the greatest of 
which is the role of the media and the public opinion that it influences.75 While media 
influence is closely related to the costs of reputation, as described below, it is important 
to expand on the concept of human life here, in order to understand its significance fully. 
The value that the US government as an entity of itself places on human life 
varies significantly according to the context surrounding the loss of that life. When 
associated with terrorism, the value of human life tends to increase drastically. While the 
loss of a life in an overseas murder hardly raises an eyebrow, if the murder was somehow 
connected with terrorism it would inevitably create significant attention. The media plays 
a large role in this process. Murders, it is sad to say, happen hundreds oftimes a day and 
are deemed virtually unworthy of media attention. Terrorism, on the other hand, is 
deemed an extremely newsworthy event and will most likely be reported by the media to 
the fullest extent possible. This jncludes interviews with the victim's family and friends. 
This type of media attention creates enormous public outcry and consequently impels 
politicians to address the issue. 
When associated with criminal activity the value of a single human life, at the 
level of the state, is seen to decrease drastically. In part, this devaluation is due to the 
routine occurrence of crime-related deaths. In the United States, a person is killed every 
75 The role that the media plays is discussed in depth by Bridgitte Nacos, Terrorism & The Media, 
(Columbia: 1994), especially ch. 2. 
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27 minutes from crime-related activity.76 The American public has become numb to the 
tragedy of such incidents, and this numbness is transferred into the attitude of the federal 
government. Except for a few high profile cases, these deaths are considered routine, and 
thus accepted. 
While the government may deem the individual life of a crime victim as of 
minimum value, the sheer number of deaths due to crime creates a cumulative effect, and 
has created concern and attention at the federal level. This concern is seen in the 
increased number of gun control initiatives and attempts at instituting stiffer punishment 
for gun related crime. Thus the cumulative value of life is significant and warrants 
governrriental concern and action. 
This discussion of the value of life has thus far only t8ken into consideration the 
actual loss of life. In order to fully grasp the cost of indivi4ua1lives, we must also include 
the significant cost associated with injuries. In some respects, the wounded actually 
present a more significant cost than those that are killed. These costs involve hospital 
care, increased publicity, physical rehabilitation, government entitlements, and mental 
anguish. An example of this cost is seen in the injured Will~am Brady, who has 
championed gun control measures since his shooting in 1981. This discussion is not 
intended to argue the merits or faults in gun control, but only to indicate that a cost in 
resources, time and money was, and continues to accrue, due to an issue that can be 
significantly attributed to the efforts and pUblicity of an injured individual. 
In comparing the current US strategy with the proposed proactive strategy, we see 
that the potential savings in lives and injuries under the proactive strategy can be 
76 U.S. Department of Justi~e, Fed~ral Bureau ofI~vestigation, "Crime in the United States, 1996," 
Uniform Crime Report, dated 28 Sep 97 
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significant. As menti<:med in the previous chapter, the proactive strategy incorporates the 
tactics of the reactive strategy and then adds more effective tactics that would foster a 
reduction of human costs. While the individual value of a life will remain the same under 
either strategy, the cumulative total will decrease in proportion to the number of lives 
saved. When the concept of a WMD terrorist attack is considered, these savings would be 
exceptional and by itself warrants incorporation of the proactive strategy. 
B. MATERIAL DAMAGES 
The discussion of material damages is broken up into two categories. The first is 
the cost to actual structures, and is thus the more tangible. The second is categorized as 
the cost of operations, and includes such factors as loss of business, knowledge and 
investment. 
The damage inflicted upon physical structures can be visualized, and 
photographed. The cost can normally be measured monetarily and, in most cases, the 
structure can be rebuilt. This cost is primarily.associated with terrorist ~ombings. In some 
cases, the cost is relatively small, as would be the case with a small car bomb intended to 
kill the occupant. More significant structural cost, however, was seen in both the 
Oklahoma Federal Building and the New York World Trade Center bombings. With the 
trend toward more destructive explosives, which could potentially include a small nuclear 
device, the potential cost of structural damage could easily skyrocket. 
Perhaps even greater than the cost of structural damage is the cost of operations. 
This cost applies equally to terrorist and criminal activity. A terrorist bombing attack will 
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inevitably affect the ability of some legitimate organization to function as normal. Even if 
the attack were carried out at a personal residence, numerous resources will be diverted 
from their intended purpose. This cost may include the elimination or det~ntion of an 
individual who would otherwise be productive. While the actual terrorist destruction of 
business qperating spaces or the diversion of assets is a significant cost, it is by no means 
the only one. The loss of operating ability due to terrorist activity can be seen in 
numerous other ways. 
The threat of a terrorist attack is in itself a detriment to business. As was seen 
recently in South Africa, the bombing of businesses that are even remotely associated 
with the US will have a deterrent effect to overseas investment. Another cost that is 
associated with either the destruction of business spaces or the killing of an individual is 
the loss in knowledge and experience. The destruction of business spaces may also 
include the loss of important documentation, computer files and business transactions, 
and is a cost that, in some cases may never be recovered. 
On the criminal side, the cost of operations is a little more indirect yet potentially 
more significant. Criminal organizations impinge on legitimate businesses in several 
ways. The most obvious are extortion and theft through both traditional and more 
innovative methods (as described in chapter 3). Crime organizations also impede the 
success of legitimate businesses through the operation of their own cover or front 
operations. These criminal fronts often conduct legitimate business through illegitimate 
means. These operations are not intended to make a profit, but rather to hide illegal 
money. This disregard for profit places legitimate businesses at a disadvantage since they 
must make a profit or risk going out of business. 
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By preventing a significant number of terrorist attacks through preemption or 
disruption, the costs of material damages might drop significantly. By attacking the 
criminal organization through 10 techniques, their ability to maintain cover operations 
and conduct business as normal would deteriorate, thus allowing legitimate businesses 
the opportunity to succeed. With respect to this cost factor, it is a simple equation of less 
terror plus less crime equals less cost. 
c. REPUTATION 
The first two cost factors, human life and material damage, are relatively tangible 
concepts in which the damage attributed to these factors can be observed or calculated. 
The remaining cost factors are less tangible. While a dead body is difficult to ignore and 
is relatively indisputable, the damage done to one's reputation is highly arguable. In an 
attempt to analyze the cost of reputation, a division between domestic and foreign 
reputation is conducted. For this discussion, reputation, both foreign and domestic, is 
associated with the government's ability to effectively counter-terrorism and crime as 
well as the perception of performing these tasks in a "just" manner. This "just war" 
concept goes directly to the issue of ethics. 77 
In the domestic realm, perhaps the most important issue that forms the 
government's reputation is specifically how well it can protect its citizens and their 
interests. America has long thought of itself as isolated from foreign aggression. With 
extremely limited and insignificant exception, the US has not faced a significant attack 
77 This is discussed in John Arquilla's "Ethics and Infonnation Warfare," National Defense Research 
Institute, (forthcoming 1999) 
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from foreign forces since the War of 1812.78 Americans have become accustomed to this 
perceived safety, and an enormous outcry and call for action arise whenever this security 
is breached. This is true whether the attack is carried out by domestic sources, as with the 
Oklahoma bombing, or from foreign influences as with the Trade Center bombing. The 
American public believes strongly that the US is without question the preeminent power 
in the world today. When this belief is challenged by terrorism within US territory, or 
against US interests abroad, the faith in America's overwhelming might and ability to 
protect its citizens is damaged. 79 As discussed in chapter 3, the proactive strategy of 
counter terrorism can significantly decrease the risk of terrorist attacks and thus decreases 
the cost, which would otherwise occur, to the government's reputation.8o 
The costs to reputation when analyzing the effects of crime are not as 
predominant as that of terrorism. This casual attitude toward crime's detrimental effect.s 
is once again attributable to the incredible frequency of its occurrence. Arriericans simply 
accept that crime runs rampant among its streets. In addition, much of the crime is either 
not reported, is unknown, 'or is simply unobserved. Thus under the current strategy the 
government's reputation for dea~ing with crime is already extremely low.81Through the 
proactive strategy, with 10 in the forefront, this reputation can be rebuilt through more 
78 The ineffective and random submarine-based attacks on the West coast during WW II are deemed to be 
insignificant. In addition, Hawaii at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor was not a state, but a US-held 
territory. 
79 46% of Americans believe that the government is not capable of preventing future terrorist attacks, The 
Gallup Poll 1995, The Gallup Organization Interview date: 4/20/95, survey # GO 22-50001-019 
80 The concept of government reputation is presented in Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International 
Politics, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) 
81 The percentage of Americans who feel that crime is the country's largest problem has grown from 4% in 
1978(interview:211 0-13/78, survey # 993-k) to over 25% in 1997(interview date: 1110-13/97, survey # GO 
116007). Over 50 % of Americans fear going out on the streets by themselves after dark. The Gallup poll 
1997( same survey), The Gallup Organization. 
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effective counter efforts that keep international crime out of the US. This will bring back 
the streets to the American people and eliminate a significant barrier to their success. 
At the international level the US government's reputation is also affected by its 
ability to effectively combat both terrorism and crime.82 An increased effectiveness in 
these end~avors and the subsequent adjustment in reputation tend to serve two major 
purposes. First, a reputation in which the US takes an effective approach to terrorism and 
crime will imbue confidence in foreign cooperation, both politically and within the 
commercial sector. The second effect of a proactive strategy will be to deter the terrorist 
and criminal organizations, as well as the foreign countries that support them. This 
enhanced US reputation might reduce the need to conduct coercive diplomacy 
Reputation is not only affected by how effective the US is at combating terrorism 
and crime, but also by the methods employed to reach this effectiveness. This issue 
delves into the areas of ''just warfare" and "waging war justly." When dealing with non-
state actors like terrorists and TeOs, many of the concepts in both these areas seem to be 
fairly clear. The concepts initially developed by Thomas Aquinas and further developed 
to encompass information operations by John Arquilla, are now ,further refined to focus 
on the use ofa 10 led proactive strategy when dealing with terrorism and TeOs.s3 
The three concepts encompassed within a just war are: right purpose, duly 
constituted authority and last resort. As described by Arquilla, these concepts seem to be 
tested and strained when applied to 10, However, when 10 is incorporated against both 
terrorists and TeOs, these concepts fall nicely into place and support the conduct ofIO 
against these groups as both ethical and just. The continuing criminal activities as well as 
82 Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics, (Princeton: 1996) 
83 See footnote 77 above 
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the ever-present terrorist threat that assaults the US on a daily basis, provides all the 
justification necessary to sell the concept of self defense. If this were not enough, the 
concepts of preserving the "American way of life" in which all persons are promised the 
noble rights oflife, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, renders more than adequate 
arguments that these operations are being performed for the "right purpose." 
The concept of duly constituted authority provides the US with a double victory. 
While the government unquestionably possesses the traditional concepts of authority, the 
terrorists and TeOs do not. The last concept of 'Just war" that perhaps requires greater 
scrutiny when incorporating 10, is that of last resort. However, once again the 
conventional concept of last resort is significantly different when dealing with non-state 
actors. The traditional concepts of negotiations, treaties, and "deals" in an effort to 
resolve a conflict are inappropriate. These organizations have in the past and \\jll 
continue in the future to conduct unlawful acts that either directly or indirectly result in 
death, destruction, and disruption. There is no other option when dealing with these 
groups. Thus, while performance of information operations may incur a significant cost 
to reputation when dealing with legitimate state actors, it is seen that these same costs are 
virtually non existent when dealing with terrorists and TeOs. 
When analyzing the concepts of "just warfighting" the costs are once again 
minute. The concepts that encompass "just warfighting" include; noncombatant 
immunity, proportionality and striving to do more good than harm. In the case of 
noncombatant immunity, the target focus that 10 can provide virtually eliminates this 
issue as a concern. 10 directed specifically at terrorists and TeOs avoids this dilemma. 
Because these groups are non-state actors, the US can target them without affecting the 
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civilian population in which they are located. In this respect, 10 becomes more ethically 
acceptable than conventional fonns of warfare. When directed against a state sponsor of 
terrorism, a properly executed and focused 10 attack can reduce or escalate the amount of 
collateral effects felt by the noncombatant population. In addition, it is more likely that an 
appropriately delivered threat of 10 attacks (overtly or suggested) will provide the 
necessary coercive incentive to abandon their support for terror or crime. 
At first glance, the concept of proportionality looks like it may be difficult to 
achieve. However, when placed in context with the fact that the concepts behind 
terrorism and crime are aimed at the complete collapse of US society and prosperity, then 
one can say that "the gloves are off." In addition, the ultimate concept behind using 10 
against terrorism and crime is the complete collapse of these groups. Thus, 
proportionality is a' non~issue in this case. Finally, the cOD:cept that 10 utilized under these 
circumstances should do more good than hann is self-evident. The danger in fulfilling 
this criterion is seen from the risk of legitimizing this' fonn of warfare and setting a 
precedent, as discussed below. 
Degradation of the government's reputation has th~ potential to cause significant 
problems, both domestically and in the international community. Domestically, these 
problems can take the shape of significant civil unrest. Internationally, a maligned 
reputation can have implications for treaties, commerce, alliances and global influence. 
As terrorism and transnational crime increase in size and scope, the manner and 
effectiveness of the government's ability to combat these threats will playa large role in 
detennining its own reputation. The proactive approach to countering terrorism and crime 




The government sets a "precedent" whenever it incorporates a new strategy or 
performs any untraditional action. This precedent can have serious repercussions on a 
government's reputation, as discussed above, and is discussed in greater focus here. In 
addition to affecting reputation, the setting of a precedent brings about several other 
issues that must be addressed. These issues include the potential for legitimizing the new 
action to the rest of the world, and the risk that the action may be conducted 
inappropriately and inefficiently. 
When the government starts to perform operations that are traditionally 
uncharacteristic in any significant form, it changes the "rules" by which th.e rest of the 
world believes they are playing. This chariging of the rules creates some positive and 
negative effects. By conducting business in a "new" manner, the government is sending 
out a message that it is unhappy or unable to deal appropriately with the current situation 
by usual means. Assuming the government is conducting business in the best interest of 
the country, this new action is an attempt to resolve the problem more effectively. In the 
case of the US and the problem of terrorism, the Tomahawk missile strikes on Osama Bin 
Laden's terrorist network, although reactive in nature, were unprecedented actions 
against international terrorism. These strikes not only raised world consciousness, but 
also pronounced US resolve and stand as a warning to deter others. While this new 
precedent in US counter terrorist efforts sent out a strong message to the world, it also 
showed, in this particular case, US disregard for world opinion. While the US may care 
very little about diplomatic ties with a country like Sudan, US reputation with its 
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European allies and many others is quite important. This situation raises the significant 
issue of, to what extent if any the US should include its allies in determining the 
implementation of a new counter terrorism and crime strategy. 
The issue of how the US should treat foreign allies when determining an 
appropriate counter terrorist and counter crime strategy is best described as diplomatic 
cost, and is broken up into three issues. First, to what degree if any should these 
governments be informed of our strategy? Second, should these countries be invited to 
cooperate in formulating and executing this strategy? Third, to what degree should their 
opinion influence US decisions? These three issues are critical in a discussion on cost and 
become even more so when dealing with the potential use ofIO in a proactive strategy. 
One of the key aspects in US current reactive strategy towards terrorism is the 
reliance upon international cooperation. This cooperation is critical in developing 
administrative measures used in counter terror and crime as discussed previously. 
However, when addre~sing the proposed proactive strategy, international cooperation or 
lack of it, has the potential to be very costly. Under the proactive strategy, international 
cooperation will remain in place for administrative matters. However, foreign inclusion 
in the 10 realm has many dangers. The use ofIO is a controversial matter within the US 
government itself. When the concept is brought into the international arena, the divisions 
become wider. Many foreign governments may find the intrusive ability ofIO a very 
troubling matter, and while allies do not "spy" on each other, the knowledge that 10 can 
be conducted in an extremely covert manner may cause international discomfort. Perhaps 
the most significant cost in sharing US intentions to utilize 10, is the possibility that the 
information will be leaked to unwanted parties. This will allow these parties either to 
72 
prepare for this strategy by creating counter measures or, as discussed below, to preempt 
the US with their own 10 attacks. By not involving allied governments into the strategy 
implementation process, the US government risks a significant outcry of protest, and 
potential alienation from allies. 
Another: extremely important issue that can potentially create significant cost is 
the danger that the US's use ofIO could encourage a more permissive view ofIO as an 
accepted form of warfare. Over the past decade the US has developed an enormous 
information and communications based infrastructure. This infrastructure is significantly 
larger than that of any other society. Because of the extent to which- the US relies upon 
these systems, any attack that targets this infrastructure could be devastating.84 In other 
states, which rely less upon information systems, the damage would be relatively less 
severe. Thus, while the US may have greater 10 capability, the US could very easily 
"lose" in an exchange ofIO attacks. This fact becomes increasingly relevant when 
dealing with non-state actors such as terrorists and criminal organizations. For these 
reasons alone, the cost of conducting 10 would seem to be exceptionally large. However, 
the very nature of terrorism and crime may make this aspect of cost i~aterial. 
Terrorists and criminals will inherently utilize any method available to fulfill their 
objectives. This includes the use ofIO techniques. This is precisely why the US must act 
now. Terrorists and criminals are quickly enhancing their capability to strike the US via 
/ 
the huge information and communications networks and they will employ these 10 tactics 
regardless of US action. 
84 A good discussion on the threats and potential consequences of cyberwar is found in Richard Hundley 
and Robert Anderson, "Emerging Challenge: Security and Safety in Cyberspace," IEEE Technology and 
Society, (Winter 199511996), pp. 19-28 
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Where the cost of setting a precedent may more likely be incurred is within the 
legitimate state system. The danger of utilizing 10, even against non-state actors, is that 
foreign states may see this employment as an opportunity to justify their own use ofIO 
against the US, or another state. This danger becomes greater if the US use ofIO is aimed 
at disrupting or destroying a state's terrorist support structure. While the goal of the 
operation may be to eliminate the terrorist organization, the support structure itself is a 
state function. These states may feel justified in conducting what they deem as retaliatory 
10 attacks on the US. While this danger legitimately exists, there are several factors 
which tend to mitigate this cost. 10 techniques have the ability, if performed 
appropriately, to remain unnoticed or to confuse the situation to an extent that tracking 
the cause of "the problem" is difficult and ambiguous. As mentioned previously, the 
simple threat of aggressive 10 attacks, either overtly or suggested, may be sufficient to 
convince foreign state~ to refrain from not only the support operations, but also from 
considering retaliatory 10 attacks. In addition, an overt threat of conventional massive 
retaliation to any 10 attack targeting US interests may cause foreign states to reconsider 
their actions. The remaining fac~or that reduces the risk of a hostile state's use ofIO 
against the US are the currently in place administrative and diplomatic measures. 
Another cost, which best fits under the precedent heading, is that of "wasting the 
asset." 85 This cost is incurred if, after the initial use ofIO, factors are applied which 
render additional use either unacceptable or ineffective. The factors, which would render 
I 
the continued use ofIO unacceptable, include the potential outcry from world opinion 
85 In the introduction of FrQm Troy to Entebbe; Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times, 
(University Press of America, 1996), John Arquilla defines "wasting asset"; "(that which) works well the 
first time because of its novelty may soon lose its luster as familiarity and the development of 
countermeasures improve the defenders' chances." 
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and the potential threat of reciprocal 10 attacks. If the international community gained the 
knowledge that the US had utilized 10, even against non-state actors, the potential for 
significant protest and the push for administrative punishment may exist. As mentioned 
previously, the use oflO-based attack is a very controversial issue in the world 
community. The notion that the US had disregarded these concerns for its own benefit, 
and without consultation with others, might anger many states. This anger might even 
culminate with the threat from foreign states to implement reciprocal 10 operations. The 
extent of this external pressure may be sufficient to abandon the use oflO in future 
action. 
Another reason that an 10-based attack may become a wasted asset, is the 
potential for the target organizations to adapt and innovate around these attacks and 
virtually render further 10 operations ineffective.· Once the, use oflO-based attacks are 
observed by these organizations, counter efforts will be performed. These efforts include 
the building of secure systems that would significantly upgrade integrity, or simply 
innovating around their use. 
On the domestic side, the political opposition to 10~based operations may prove 
sufficient to relegate it~ conduct to a "one shot deal." The factors that would most greatly 
affect the opinion of domestic policy makers would be the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the initial attack. If operations were conducted that were unobserved 
by outside parties and were seen to provide a significant victory against terror or crime, 
the 10-based attacks might be allowed to continue, at least till the first mishap. If, on the 
other hand, a mishap were to occur, the parties in opposition to this form of tactic would 
"scream bloody murder," and make a significant effort to eliminate its use. 
. . 
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In this section" several costs have been lumped together under the heading of 
"precedent." All these costs relate, to varying degrees, to the initial use of 10- based 
operations. While many of these costs are potentially great, they are mitigated by two key 
issues. First, if performed properly, many of these costs are non-existent; and second, the 
potential benefit of these operations likely outweighs their cost by far. 
E. ESCALATION 
A danger in conducting any operations against terrorists; whether proactive or 
reactive, conventional or 10, is the risk that the terrorists will escalate the conflict. In 
order to understand the degree of risk it is necessary to understand why this escalation 
may be performed, and how it is affected by counter efforts. Two basic reasons stand out 
as the main cause of escalation. These are retaliation and losing ground. Terrorists are 
very conscious of their image, in both world opinion and within their own constituencies. 
In order to maintain constituency support and gain world respect, they must present 
themselves as strong and resilient. Thus, when,a terrorist organization is attacked, it must 
respond to this attack or risk losing credibility. The magnitude of the response must be 
sufficient to provide the illusion that the organization was not significantly damaged and 
that they are capable of not only retaliating but doing so with greater power. 
Another reason why terrorists may escalate the conflict is simply because they 
feel that they are losing ground in obtaining their goals, This point is amplified if the 
terrorists feel that their organization is on its "last legs." In an effort to revitalize the 
organization the terrorists may feel that a significant act, that would warrant considerable 
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attention from the media and the world, is their last hope. As death and destruction 
become an ever-present aspect of everyday life, this escalation may end up being 
significant, to include the use ofWMDs.86 
The proposed proactive 10 strategy has the potential both to inflame as well as to 
extinguish this cost. In many cases, retaliatory strikes are conducted to maintain or 
enhance one's reputation. Thus when an attack is performed overtly by conventional 
means as was seen with the Tomahawk missile strikes in August 1998, the threat of 
retaliation is considerable. However, if an attack on a terrorist organization were 
conducted covertly, two important factors would arise. The humiliation absorbed by the 
terrorist organization would only be a fraction, compared to what it would suffer from an 
overt attack. The absence of media attention that would be associated with this low to 
zero profile attack would thus alleviate the need for the terrorists to conduct operations in 
an attempt to "save face." The second factor of a covert operation would simply be the 
inability of the terrorist organization to determine who performed the attack, if they were 
able to deduce that an attack was performed at all. In addition, by either entering into 
their decision process or destroying this decision process, the US would be able to disrupt 
their planning cycle. By hampering the group's ability to properly organize, the US can 
effectively reduce the prospects of a retaliatory strike. 
The nature of current US counter terrorist strategy is to slowly wear away the 
capabilities of terrorist organizations until they become too weak to operate successfully. 
If indeed this strategy was effective, it would, at some point bring the terrorists to a point 
86 Jerold M. Post in his article "Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations and 
Constraints," Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, (Lexington MA: 
Lexington Books,1987), pp. 101, discusses the potential for "terrorist losers" in an attempt to "regain 
prominence" may resort to nuclear weapons. 
77 
of desperation. It is at this point that the risk of a highly escalated attack would occur. 
The proactive strategy avoids this threat by providing the possibility to seriously weaken 
a terrorist organization in a limited amount of time. In addition, the proactive strategy 
keeps the terrorists on the defensive and subsequently prevents the terrorists from 
sustaining and introducing new operations. As discussed in a previous section, the threat 
of terrorist organizations escalating into IO-based attacks, while present, is irrelevant to 
this analysis. The terrorists will utilize this weapon regardless of US actions. 
In the case of criminal escalation, the danger is from the criminal's increased 
violence and accelerated progression toward terrorist tactics. The incorporation of the 
proactive strategy will substantially increase the effectiveness of counter crime efforts. 
Yet this effectiveness might for the first time make a relevant impact on criminal activity. 
Placed in this unfamili"ar situation the criminal may be inclined to seek new ways of 
doing business. This may include the conduct of operations that are inherently more 
risky, branching out into new untapped markets, or increasing levels of violence. This 
increased violence could come in one of two forms. The first, would be increased 
violence between rival criminal organizations. As the proactive strategy decreases both 
supply and demand, the criminal organizations might begin to fight amongst themselves 
in order to gain control of limited resources and market share. This would include both 
the domestic gangs, in which rival violence already occurs, but also the cartels and major 
organizations themselves. This inner fighting has both a positive and negative effect. The 
rivalry to some degree will perform the task of eliminating a percentage of the criminal 
organizations, or at least some of the people that are employed within these 
organizations. The negative effect is that this violence may very well spill over onto the 
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streets where innocent people will inevitably get injured. The second form of violence is 
perhaps the more alarming. This violence consists of increased use of terrorist techniques 
in the attempt either to intimidate police and government officials into ceasing their 
prosecution, or simply to wage a form of warfare against the authorities that are impeding 
their progress. 
F. FOREIGN SOVEREIGNTY 
Foreign sovereignty must be considered whenever the US conducts operations 
outside of its own territory. The potential costs of violating sovere~gnty are significant 
and range from world condemnation, retaliation, and a damaged reputation. When 
dealing with non-state actors such as terrorists and criminals, the issues behind foreign 
sovereignty become clouded; and when the concept ofIO is included they become even 
more ambiguous. 
As is being currently seen with the decision to intervene in Kosovo, any 
determination to violate sovereign territory is a very difficult and closely scrutinized 
matter. Consensus with other states is normally a key factor in forming this type of 
decision. Ignoring world opinion by conducting unilate~al action, as discussed earlier, has 
the potential to create enormous world criticism. Much of the international community's 
concern behind any violation of sovereignty, is the fear that by not advocating every 
state's right to sovereignty, their own may some day be ignored. 
Perhaps the greatest danger in violating sovereignty is the potential for the state 
that was violated to seek retribution. This retribution can come in many various forms. 
The most acceptable, in the eyes of the US, would be purely administrative measures, 
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including sanctions, diplomatic isolation etc. There are three reasons why this will most 
likely not be the form of retribution. First, the US itself did not utilize administrative 
measures so why should they? Second, administrative measures will only be effective if 
they gain support of the world community, which the US leads. Third, the state seeking 
retribution was already conducting some action that was deemed atrocious or unlawful, 
so they are probably not constrained by morals. 
The more likely and more disconcerting form of retribution is in the form of some 
level of violence. This violence can take the shape of limited strikes (which will 
inevitably be labeled terrorism by the US), or all out war. The probability that a foreign 
state will initiate a conventional war with the US is minute. The conventional capability 
of the US military would make pursuing this course suicide. Thus the state is in all 
practicality limited to terrorist-type attacks. 
All international terrorist and criminal organizations utilize the foreign 
sovereignty issue as a shield against US "persecution." Some of these organizations do so 
with the knowledge and support, either active or passive, of the "host" country. Others do 
so by taking advantage of a state's weakness and inability to prevent it. Sovereignty is 
defined as authority in and control over an area. Thus an argument can be made that 
states that do not have the ability to prevent terrorist and criminal organizations from 
operating within their territory, do not actually possess sovereignty anyway. While this 
may actually be a very good argument in the academic realm, it has little application in 
world politics, where its practical application is unrealistic. Thus, any conventional 
method used to attack these organizations must pass into and intrude upon foreign soil 
and, to some degree, violate another country's sovereignty. 
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The use of 10 has the potential to eliminate the requirement for any physical 
incursion into foreign territory. While this lack of physical presence greatly reduces the 
cost of sovereignty violation, it does not necessarily eliminate it completely. The 
concepts behind cyberspace incursion are not as of yet fully developed. None the less, the 
advent of 10 within a proactive counter terrorist and crime strategy provides numerous 
advantages that can greatly reduce the costs associated with violation of foreign 
sovereignty . 
First, there are no clear international laws that govern the use of information 
operations.87 While many countries are struggling to obtain a clear understanding of its 
implications, others are ignorant of its capabilities. In fact, research and continued 
innovation are being performed every day that transforms 10 capabilities and 
subsequently alters the likely repercussions from its use. In addition, 10 can be conducted 
with extreme subtlety. Unlike Tomahawk missiles, which provide enormous visual 
evidence of use, 10 can be accomplished without detection. The claim that-sovereignty 
was violated is quite obvious with conventional methods; however, with 10, such 
violations are extremely difficult to prove. In addition, 10 allows the US to target the 
information and communications systems of terrorists or criminals specifically. These 
systems are the personal property of the organization and not likely of the government of 
the state where they are located. By solely attacking these systems and avoiding any 
damage, or for that matter avoiding the need even to touch foreign soil, it becomes 
extremely difficult for states to claim that a violation of sovereignty has occurred. 
87 A good discussion on the threat of cybercrime and the lack of sufficient international law is provided in 
Louise Shelley's article "Crime, Corruption and Technology in a World Without Borders," Journal of 
International Affairs, Spring 1998, Vol. 51, No.2, pp. 605- 620 
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Terrorists and" criminals have long thrived behind the shield of foreign 
sovereignty. They conduct their operations with relative impunity, running back to hide 
when necessary. 10 provides the US with a tool that can reach these organizations. While 
not totally eliminating the cost of sovereignty, 10 significantly reduces it. 
G. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
Civil liberties are among the most closely guarded rights in the US. The concept 
of civil liberties is derived from the first 10 amendments of the Constitution known as the 
"Bill of Rights," and is intended to prevent the abuse of the government's power. When 
discussing the conduct ofIO, the two amendments most feared to be in jeopardy are the 
First, which guarantees free speech, religion and press, and the Fourth, which protects 
against illegal search and seizure. Any discussion that inc!udes the possibility of 
infringing upon these rights, regardless of how minute, is highly scrutinized and is 
virtually political suicide. The fear that "big brother" is watching is enough to send civil 
rights advocates scrambling into action. The protection of these rights tends to be viewed 
by some as an absolute, without regard for the consequenc~s. 
While some advocates would claim that these rights must be held above all others, 
even Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that this freedom must stop at 
"shouting 'fire' in a crowded theater." Clearly, there are situations in which the greater 
'good of the community must prevail over individual rights. The growing threat of more 
powerful terrorist attacks, as well as the ever increasing assaults from criminal activities 
pose key dilemmas. The appropriate and supervised use ofIO does not impinge upon the 
rights of law-abiding citizens, but rather is designed.to ensure these rights for future 
, . 
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generations. It must also be brought out that, in the domestic realm, the use ofIO would 
only be necessary in a very limited number of cases, and would be implemented only 
after proper authorization was received. The overwhelming majority of US citizens (well 
over 99%) would suffer absolutely no effects from the use ofIO. 
While performing 10 operations is in the interest of preserving the freedom which 
US citizens have become accustomed to, the potential for significant public outcry 
exists.88 While the knowledge ofIO within the proactive strategy must, for previously 
stated reasons, be a very sensitive and restricted matter, this secrecy may itself cause 
turmoil. The knowledge that 10 is being undertaken by the government will inevitably 
become known to the public sector. The fear that these operations will infringe upon the 
rights of ordinary citizens, or will be utilized for political purposes, might cause public 
outcry and a demand for its termination. Properly preparing for these accusations may 
help to mitigate these costs. Ifnecessary, providing the facts about 10 could educate the 
public to its effectiveness and exceptional discrimination. In addition, appropriate checks 
and balances that relegate it use and ensure its appropriateness, will diminish the fear of 
unwarranted intrusion into the public realm. 
When analyzing the cost to civil liberties, it is necessary to address the costs that 
are currently incurred under the existing reactive strategy. The American people have 
already incurred a cost on their freedom. This cost is seen in the fear of walking the 
streets at night, or the fear that their son or daughter might start using illegal drugs. It is 
also seen when businessmen are unable to provide for their family because they were 
88 The percentage of Americans who would accept increased surveillance upon US citizens rose from 37% 
• in 1995 (interview: 4/20/95, survey # 22-50001-019) to over 45% in 1996 (interview: 7/29/96, survey 
107357). When asked the same question with regards to foreign citizens residing within the US, 63% of 
Americans favored increased surveillance practices. Gallup Poll, 1996, The Gallup Organization. 
83 
driven out of business or robbed by organized crime. Even more devastating is the cost 
associated with the loss life from a terrorist bomb. Virtually all the previous cost factors 
discussed above playa role in determining an individual's civil liberties and rights. The 
accumulation of these costs will become increasingly clear in the cost comparison 
provided below. 
H. COST COMPARISON 
Seven separate cost factors associated with counter crime and terror have been 
analyzed. These cost factors can be combined into an "aggregate cost." The factors are 
not valued in numerical terms, but rather relatively. Thus, the comparison that follows is 
a measure of relative rather than absolute values. In addition, each of the costs are 
probabilistic in nature and are based on past experience and an assumed proficiency in 
IO-based operations. The methods to achieve this proficiency will be discussed in chapter 
5. 
Under the current reactive strategy, the US has experienced an average of90 
terrorist incidents per year.89 The aggregate cost inflicted by each incident is a reflection 
of the severity or intensity of that particular attack. Intensity is the term utilized to 
describe the potential death and destruction inflicted by a single specific attack. As a 
general rule of thumb, as the intensity of a terrorist attack increases the value of each of 
the seven cost factors will increase. As the cost factors increase the aggregate cost of that 
attack rises correspondingly. 
89 Terrorist incidents directed at the US or its interests abroad. Based on 5 years 1993-1997, Patterns of 
Global Terrorism 
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Figurel below provides a visual representation of aggregate cost associated with 
various types of terrorist attacks. While the actual realized cost of any attack will be 
determined by the specific details, this diagram provides a general representation. The 
curve begins with the aggregate cost associated with an individual shooting. This incident 
assumes an average, non-politically significant individual who is targeted for the simple 
fact that he or she is an American. At the other end of the spectrum is the increasingly 
plausible scenario of a terrorist use of WMDs. Spanning virtually the entire range is the 
. cost associated with cyberterror. Cyberterror is able to encompass the full cost spectrum 
due to its inherent ability both to focus on a very specific target, or to be very 
indiscriminate and broad. It must be noted that the most severe attack observed during the 
past lO years has been "the New York World Trade Center bombing, yet when plotted on 
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Figure 1: Aggregate Cost for Terrorist Attack Intensity 
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As each attack is perfonned the total cost increases accordingly, and at the end of 
the year, (or any designated time period) the total cost is derived by summing all the 
individual aggregate costs. Thus in an average year where 90 terrorist attacks are 
perfonned, the total cost incurred due to the employment of the reactive strategy is quite 
large. 
The proposed proactive strategy invokes a cost prior to the conduct of any 
terrorist act. This initial cost, absent under the reactive strategy, is representative of the 
expense associated with the use ofIO. The preponderance of this initial aggregate cost is 
felt in tenns of pressures imposed on civil liberties and foreign s(;)Vereignty. 
Although complete success is not likely, the proactive strategy may be able to 
. stop a large percentage of low intensity terrorist attacks. Thu's, just as with the reactive 
strategy, total cost will be a summation of each incident's aggregate cost, but will include . 
the above mentioned initial cost ofIO. The IO-based proactive strategy will provide a . 
significantly greater ability to prevent the greater intensity attacks, including WMD and 
cyberterror. This is true because the preparations for these attac~s are of high profile and 
can be detected with the use ofIO. The cost savings associated with preventing a WMD 
attack, by itself, justifies the incorporation of the IO-based proactive strategy. The 
questions that must be asked are how great a cost does the analyst believe utilizing 10 
engenders and how many terrorists attacks or how intense must an attack be before this 
cost is deemed acceptable? 
The sheer number of transnational criminal acts conducted on a daily basis 
renders the valuation of aggregate cost for each incident intangible. Crime is a perpetual 
86 
problem that must be v~ewed in larger overall terms. Thus the total cost, which as with 
terrorism is the sum of aggregate costs, will be the focus of this analysis. 
The current reactive strategy towards crime has allowed criminal organizations to 
expand their illegal operations, enter into profitable cooperation agreements, and even 
enter into the legitimate business world through illegitimate means. As the criminal world 
becomes increasingly "high tech," maintaining the reactive policy will continue to benefit' 
the criminals and impose an increasing cost upon the American people. Thus the total 
cost of crime, already at a staggering level, is continually rising at an increasing rate. 
As with terrorism, the proactive strategy toward crime brings with it some initial 
costs. The initial aggregate cost is a combination of the cost due to current crimes as well 
as the cost incurred from using 10. As the proactive strategy is incorporated, the total 
cost will decrease in proportion to the decrease in crime. Similar to the terrorist analysis, 
the proactive strategy's effectiveness will most likely be less than 100 percent. However, 
even if some crime continues, the aggregate cost will still decrease significantly and will 
ultimately stabilize at a certain level well below that of the costs imposed by the reactive 
strategy. 
I. CONCLUSION 
In order to justify accepting and implementing a proactive strategy in the US's 
battle against terrorism and crime, a clear benefit over the current reactive strategy has to 
be established. With this in mind, seven cost factors were analyzed in this chapter, to 
capture the costs involved with each strategy. The aggregate cost of each terrorist 
87 
incident is determined by summing the value of each cost factor. The total cost, of any 
time period, is thus the summation of the individual aggregate costs. The total cost of 
each strategy was then compared and the relative cost savings established. 
Within both the cases of terror and crime the proactive strategy was seen to 
provide substantial cost savings. While the proactive strategy brings some inherent costs 
that are not present with the reactive strategy, the devaluation in other factors more than 
overrides these costs. While the value assigned to each of the cost factors will ultimately 
be determined by expert analysts, allowing perhaps some degree of bias, the cost 
comparison analysis maintains its importance and relevance. The proposed proactive 
strategy, which incorporates significant IO-based operations, provides the US with an 
instrument to combat terrorism and crime effectively at the lowest possible cost to the 
American citizen. 
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v. THE TOOLS AND WEAPONS 
This chapter analyzes the application of advanced technologies under the 
proposed proactive strategy for countering terror and crime. A good starting point is 
provided by the notion that proactive information operations can be divided into two 
categories: the strategic and operational attack paradigms90. The strategic attack paradigm 
describes the use of infol11?-ation operations as a distinct weapon that can be used 
independently.91 Th~ operational attack paradigm uses information operations as a tool in 
support of other, more "conventional," means. The proactive strategy proposed herein 
employs both paradigms in its effort to counter terror and crime. When applied to 
terrorism and crime, the strategic attack paradigm is divided into three areas; intelligence 
collection, disruption and destruction. The performance of these three actions entails the 
use of advanced computer systems (predominantly in the realm of cyberspace), advanced 
weaponry and psychological operations. Under the operational attack paradigm, 
information operations are used to enhance reactive measures. In particular, the superior 
intelligence provided by information operations will significantly empower prosecution 
and administrative measures. 
90 Michael L. Brown, The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Information Dimension, (Fairfax, VA, 
AFCEA International Press, 1996) . 
91 This concept is addressed by Roger Molander, Andrew Riddile and Peter Wilson, Strategic Information 
Warfare: A New Face of War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996). 
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A. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 
Perhaps the greatest drawback of the proactive strategy is the heavy requirement 
for intelligence. This intelligence must be accurate, timely and both qualitatively and 
quantitatively sufficient to allow for the proper conduct of operations. However, the US 
intelligence community is currently ill-prepared to deal with the information savvy 
terrorist and criminal of the:: 21 Sf century. Current intelligence assets were designed to 
cope with the Cold War threat, and while these assets are still being effectively utilized, 
they are neither appropriately focused nor adequate to cope with either terrorism or 
transnational crime. The products obtained from SIOINT, IMINT, and HUMINT are all 
limited, due to the principally non-state nature of terrorist and criminal organizations. As 
these groups accelerate their reliance upon' advanced intelligence systems, these 
traditional collection methods will become increasingly antiquated. Scott D. 
Breckinridge writes: 
"The terroris! world is an extremely difficult intelligence target, the 
groups being small elusive and often unknown, even to those friendly 
to them. The security and intelligence forces charged with blocking 
their depredations are likely to meet more failure than success." 92 
Today's SIOINT capabilities derive primarily from intercepted of 
cOIpmunications and radar emissions. However, terrorist and criminal organizations 
I ' 
provide an extremely limited communications footprint. In addition, the communications 
that are performed are done through the use of encrypted digital cellular telephones and 
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networked encrypted computer systems. These technologies make it extremely difficult 
both to intercept and decrypt communications. While the US government has limited the 
ability of legitimate businesses to protect their computer systems, the availability of 128-
bit DES encryption on the international market has provided terrorists and criminals the 
security they desire.93 
IMINT has also displayed limited ability to gain the necessary information on 
terrorist and criminal activities. The overhead imagery provided by assets like the KH-15 
spy satellite produce very little good intelligence on these threats. Perhaps the largest 
contribution is the occasional imagery of terrorist training sites and the location of illegal 
harvests for drug production. While this imagery may provide some useful information, 
computer programs are available that accurately calculate the time in which the satellites 
pass overhead. With this information, these organizations are able to mask their 
operations. The use of aircraft-based imagery from assets like the SR-71, U-2 or J-Stars is 
also quite limited. The costs and risks associated with violating sovereign airspace are 
also significant obstacles to their use for these purposes. 
HUMINT is traditionally the most relied upon method used to provide relevant 
intelligence on terrorist and criminal groups. However;HUMINT has some severe 
limitations of its own94 • The ability of intelligence agencies to plant an agent within these 
organizations is extremely limited. Members of terrorist organizations are often recruited 
92 Scott D. Breckinridge, "Intelligence after the Cold War," International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, Fall 1997 
93 A discussion of the encryption issue is presented in James Adams, The Next World War, (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1998), pp. 213-223 and Senator John Kerry, The New War, (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1997), pp. 126-132 
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from known families, and at a young age, often 8 or 9. In addition the requirement to 
conduct terrorist operations is necessary to advance to any significant position within the 
organization. This, coupled with the fact that terrorist organizations are becoming 
increasingly networked and compartmentalized, means that the knowledge possessed by 
one individual is often severely restricted. The ability to "turn" an existing terrorist 
member is equally difficult, due to the fanatic and unreliable nature of many terrorists. On 
the criminal side, family affiliation is also extremely important in gaining entry into the 
upper levels of the organization. Some criminal organizations, like the Colombian cartels, 
employ former intelligence officers who perform background checks on potential 
"business" associates in order to validate authenticity.95 Clearly, alternative methods of 
intelligence collection and a new mind-set are required if the US is to confront and 
prevail in the battle against terror and crime. The advanced technologies of the 21 sl 
century provide the necessary tools to perform this intelligence operation . 
. The collection of intelligence through use of advanced technologies is divided 
into two categories. The first is performed through manipulation and exploitation of 
computer systems. The second is the direct collection of information by advanced sensors 
and photography. 
The embrace of advanced computer systems by terror and crime organizations, 
while increasing their efficiency and effectiveness, have also exposed these groups to new 
threats of surveillance and intelligence collection. This intelligence is collected by 
94 A brief discussion of intelligence capabilities against terrorism can be found in John Arquilla, David 
Ronfelt and Michele Zanini, Networks, Netwars and Information-Age Terrorism, (Santa Monica: Rand, 
1999, forthcoming) 
95 Kerry, The New War, pp. 76-79 
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entering the organization's computer network and gaining access to computer files96• This 
process can be conducted in numerous ways but the most prevalent are through the use of 
sniffer programs, and backdoors. James Adams describes a sniffer program as: 
"A program that attaches itself to a computer system and records the 
first 128 keystrokes of people gaining legitimate access. Within 
those 128 keystrokes would reside the password and log-in 
information for that account. The sniffer would then transmit those 
keystrokes back to the hacker, who would have all he needed to 
roam around the target system." 97 
Once access is gained to the system, the hacker has virtual free reign to access any 
information within the. system. As terrorists and criminals increasingly rely upon 
computers to organize their operations, the amotint of information available for counter 
efforts will increase accordingly. The ability to view an organization's payroll, financial 
status and support structure can all be highly exploite~. Other information, including 
equipment purchases, memoranda discussing future operations, or even personal 
information and correspondence can all be capitalized upon. 
The "backdoor" program requires future planning on the part of the intelligence 
agencies98• The backdoor is a program that is initially implanted within the computer 
system, even before it gets to the customer. Once the system is in place, the operator 
simply calls up the computer, activates the backdoor and gains entry without having to 
know the password. Thus, arrangements are made with the manufacturers of the computer 
96 "Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia: Editor's Journey to meet Bin-Laden Described," London al-Quds AI-
'Arabia, 27 November 1996, p.4 
97 Adams, The Next World War, p',193 
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systems to allow government access. This arrangement is very delicate, considering the 
manufacturer's reputational concerns. If denied this sort of admittance, access can still be 
accomplished by intercepting the shipment during delivery. Another difficulty with 
implanting a backdoor program is identifying the correct computer systems. Terrorist and 
crime organizations will normally utilize a series of "fronts" or "middle men" to disguise 
the ultimate destination. However, even if only a small percentage of back doors are ever 
activated the return will have been worth the effort. In addition, backdoor access can 
grant the hacker a "systems manager'~ status. This status allows the ability to erase entry 
data, cover all actions, and maintain anonymity. This renders the hacker's activity 
virtually invisible, and mitigates the potential problem of retaliation, or of source "cut-
off." 
Perhaps the greatest practical difficulty of this collection method is gaining the 
expertise necessary to carrying it out. While the US government possesses some 
extremely intelligent individuals, civilians form the vast majority of those with advanced 
hacker skills. In many cases, these civilian "experts" are identified only after they have 
hacked into the government's computer systems and were subsequently apprehended. An 
attempt to convert these individuals into public employees is a risky prospect, and has 
significant potential to backfire.99 Thus, the intelligence agencies must somehow attract 
talented individuals through appropriate incentives or develop their own in-house 
expertise. 
98 A discussion of the ability of computer oriented operations is presented in an article by Valeri Lorenzo, 
"Guarding against a new digital enemy," Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1, 1997. These hacker 
concept are also discussed in Adams, The Next World War. 
99 The story of Justin Petersen, who was employed by the FBI after his own arrest, is recounted in Adams, 
The Next World War, pp. 156-157 
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The second method of intelligence collection is through the use of advanced 
sensors and photography. The advent ofMEMS, Micro Electronic-Mechanical Systems, 
UAVs, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and MAVs, Micro Air Vehicles will provide 
drastically increased opportunity for enhanced sensor and imagery effectiveness. The US 
Department of Defense has spent over three billion dollars on UAV research since 1979, 
and the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) is budgeted to spend 
another half billion by 2003.100 Much of the research is intended to support the 
conventional ground force commander by delivering enemy order of battle information, 
providing a "God's eye View." This technology has been tested and proven effective. 101 
The Israeli and American aircraft industries have developed the Pioneer UAV that flew 
over 1700 hours during the Gulf War. The Predator UAV, of the US Air Force 11th 
Reconnaissance Squadron has already logged more that 3,800 hours flying over Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
The primary advantage to employing UA V s is the lack of personnel required to 
enter potentially hostile territory. In addition, the UAV has significantly greater 
maneuver capabilities than manned aircraft, and presents a considerably decreased radar 
signature. A UAV utilizing noise-reduced propulsion can go completely unnoticed. 
While the UA V has already proven to be effective, it is constrained by several 
factors. Among the greatest drawbacks is lack of endurance. Addressing this and other 
issues, DARPA has budgeted funds for projects like the Airborne Communications Node 
IOOAn in depth analysis of the current and future capabilities ofUAV technology is presented in "Drone 
Wars," Jane's Defense Weekly, June 3 1998 and "DARPA UA V Technology Budgets top $500 Million," 
Military Robotics, ,April 17, 1998 
101 "Drone Wars," Janes Defense Weekly, June 3, 1998 
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(ACN), which will provide extended range and rapid deployment of advanced military 
communications system. Programs like the Adaptive Spectral Reconnaissance Program 
will develop advanced reconnaissance systems based on spectrally adaptive imaging 
sensors. Another of the more promising sensing systems is the Millimeter Wave 
Targeting & Imaging System (MMWTIS). "This system will use active and passive 
techniques to achieve high resolution targeting and imaging,,102 at millimeter wave (W-
band) frequencies. Once operational, these systems will provide an enormous amount of 
data back to the analysts. The volume of data itself presents a significant problem that is 
being addressed through programs like TRW's Applique. 103 This "system of systems" 
will compile data from all sources and provide the warfighter with a clear understanding 
of the battlefield. 
When exploring the use ofUAVs in the fight again'st terror and crime, an 
important development is the capability for intermediate platform control and automatic 
target recognition. 104 With the majority of terrorist and criminal organizations being 
located in remote or foreign territory, the US will not likely have conventional forces 
staged nearby. However, with intermediate platform control relay units, special forces can 
gain control of the vehicle and bounce imagery and information back to the rear. Another 
important development is the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV). These specially 
configured UAVs will be able to identify a target and deploy weapons systems. This 
capability along with the disruptive and destructive weapon systems, mentioned below, 
will be able to pay huge dividends in the fight against terror and crime. 
. . 
102 Jerome Chandler, "Microplanes·; tiny spy planes," Popular science, January 1998 
103 Adams, The Next World War, pp. 111-115 
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While the UAV's sensors may be able to provide exceptional information, the 
limited endurance hinders the ability to maintain continues surveillance, so necessary to 
gaining specific information about terrorist and criminal operations. However, with a 
little ingenuity and the exploitation of MA V s and MEMS, this surveillance can be 
possible. Employing a UA V that can store these tiny technologies, fly to the target area, 
land and deploy'these systems posses seemingly limitless possibilities. The use of special 
forces to deploy these mini systems is another potential employment tactic. 
Professor Chih Ming Ho from UCLA has revolutionized the area of 
miniaturization. Chih' s work in the area of avionics has propelled a new class of micro-
sized sensing and mechanical systems, known as (MEMS).105 As this technology is 
pursued, the capabilities of intelligence gathering will blossom. These MEMS will have 
the capability to carry a multitude of sensing devices able to detect motion" light, sound, 
smell, images and much more. The ability and size of these sensors have spurred concepts 
like ant spies, sensor grass, and surveillance dust. 
MEMS have also spawned the development of Micro Air Vehicles (MAVs)106. 
MA V s are intended to be small enough to fit into the palm of the hand. Current 
development requirements call for a range capability of up to 10 km, speeds up to 30 
miles per hour and mission duration times of 20 minutes to 2 hours. The operating time 
constraint is primarily due to the power expended during flight. If these systems were to 
land, or attach themselves to a host object, then the power can then be utilized by the 
104 The technology concepts are discussed in the articles referenced in footnote 11 
105 MEMS is discussed in Adams, The Next World War, pp. 122-137 
106 A good discussion on the capabilities and future of micro sized flying machines is presented by Jerome 
Chandler, "Microplanes; tiny spy planes," Popular Science, January 1998 and "DARPA VA V 
Technology," Military Robotics, April 17, 1998 
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embarked sensing equipment and significantly extend the operating life. In addition, 
research 'is currently being conducted on alternative propulsion systems that would extent 
the operating life cycle. This research includes concepts like a reciprocating chemical 
muscle (RCM) pioneered by Georgia Tech Research Institute, and the hydrogen-powered 
jet turbine from MIT.lo7 
The military has pursued this technology as part of their "Land Warrior"lo8 
program. The concept behind Land Warrior is to provide the average infantry soldier a 
stand..:off capability. In other words, the soldier of the 21 sl century will be able to launch 
MA V s from his rucksack and send them over the hill or around the corner, to determine 
enemy positions. When used in conjunction with UAVs or special operations forces these 
technologies will provide surveillance capabilities from extended ranges. In addition, as 
the size of high-energy weapons continues to reduce their employment by a Micro 
Combat Air Vehicle (MCA V) will become possible. 
B. DISRUPTIVE & DESTRUCTIVE OPERATIONS 
While gaining information is an extremely important function of efforts to counter 
terror and crime, it is normally collected in support of direct or indirect action. With the 
use oflO, this action can be predominantly non-lethal in nature, dividing into two 
categories: disruption and destruction. Often the difference will be simply the extent to 
which the 10 tactics are employed. As an example, hacking into an airfield control system 
107 Chandler, "Microplanes; tiny spy planes," Popular Science, p.57 
108 Adams, The Next World War, pp. 109-120 
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can be performed simply to disrupt traffic, or it can be manipulated to cause a collision. 
These two categories can themselves be divided into three subsets: operations performed 
within cyberspace; operations utilizing advanced weaponry; ,and psychological 
operations. 
When discussing disruptive and destructive operations in cyberspace, access to 
the terrorist or criminal organization's computer systems must be accomplished. As 
described above, this entry is accomplished through the use of backdoors, sniffer 
programs or during the initial programming back in the manufacturing process. Once 
access is gained, the programmer can install computer malicious codes (CMC) such as, 
Trojan horses, logic bombs, and worm viruses.109 
The logic bomb is placed within the computer system prior to delivery to the 
customer, or can be inserted by a hacker once the computer becomes connected with the 
Internet. The logic bomb lies dormant and hidden within the system until activated. The 
"bomb" can be actiyated by a number of methods. These methods include: programming 
of a pre-designated time; activation by the programmer via the Internet or electrical 
emitting device; or the program can be designed to activate upon the performance of a 
designated function. In other words, the "bomb" can be designed to activate when the 
user enters the Net, when a particular e-mail address is called up, or when virtually any 
other normally performed operation is undertaken. Once activated, the programs can 
perform a myriad oftasks including releasing a virus, overloading the system or re-
addressing communications. 
109 See footnote 9 above 
99 
A Trojan horse is a similar CMC device, but is entered into the system hidden 
within another program. Thus, when the targeted terrorist or criminal downloads or runs a 
particular program into his system, he unwittingly inserts the Trojan horse along with it. 
Once inside, the capabilities are the same as with the logic bomb. The Worm Virus is a 
program that is designed to self-replicate. The objective of the worm virus is to 
sufficiently utilize the system's computing power so that other operations are impossible, 
thus overloading the c~pability of the processing system. Another nasty tool is the 
polymorphic virus that changes it appearance every time it infects a new program. This 
continual transformation makes it increasingly difficult both to locate and destroy. While 
these programs can be designed to destroy an organization's computer systems, a greater 
profit may come from manipulation, as was discussed in chapter 3. 
Advanced weaponry has als'o opened the door to numerous options for combating 
terrorism and crime. Many of these developing advanced weapons systems fall under the 
heading of Non Lethal Weapons (NL W)1I0. However, if employed by untrained 
personnel, and under certain conditions, these weapons can most definitely kill. Research 
into these weapons systems has been focused principally. on their use by domestic law 
enforcement and military humanitarian and peace keeping operations. Thus, the potential 
for these weapons to cause greater damage than desired has slowed their acceptance. 
However, when applied to the matter of terrorist and criminal organizations, the strict 
necessity to limit injury and avert 'death does not seem similarly inhibiting. Thus, with 
110 Excellent discussions on advanced weaponry, to include NLW, is found in Douglas Pasternak, "Wonder 
Weapons," US News and World Report, July 7 1997 and "Measure for Measure," Jane's Defense Weekly, 
June 24, 1998, and in Adams, The Next World War, pp. 138-155 
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very little refinement, these systems can be refocused on terror and transnational crime 
organizations. 
One of the more promising weapon systems is·in the area of dectromagnetic pulse 
or high energy radio frequencies (HERF). When utilized within the microwave 
frequencies (.5 - 100 GHz range), these weapons have the ability to "fry" the circuits of 
any electronic system. In addition, these systems can effect the internal structure of the 
human body causing pain, .bums, epileptic seizures, cardiac arrest and even death. As the 
technology advances the effective range and precision of the weapon will allow for 
greater flexibility in use. Currently, the size of these weapons is fairly large. Thus 
employment must be conducted from a relatively large platform like a vehicle. However, 
US intelligence has learned of a Russian- built HERF weapon of extremely small size. 
The Weapon was code named the "Beer Can" II I and tests have proven its limited 
effectiveness within a range of 1 kilometer. As advances in miniaturization and direction' 
capability are made, the potential to mount a HERF weapon on a UA V will exist. This 
combination allows operators to perform their attacks from greater stand-off distances, 
and with virtually complete anonymity. The terrorists or criminals may not only be 
unable to determine the cause of the problem, but even if they suspect the cause they 
would be unable to verify the identity of the attacker. 
Additional possibilities lie in the low frequency bands of electromagnetic 
radiation. This area is specifically intended to effect personnel. These low frequencies 
effect the chemical makeup in the human brain, releasing chemicals like histamines. As 
these technologies become increasingly refined they will possess the ability to put 
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persons to sleep or cause instant flu-like symptoms. Again, the possibilities when used 
against terror and crime are enormous. By virtually knocking out an entire terrorist 
headquarters, the US could significantly disrupt operations. The subsequent confusion 
and fear would provide additional collateral benefits. 
Acoustic weapons are another emerging capability that affects physical structures 
as well as the human body. At certain frequencies, well below the human hearing level, 
subsonic waves can be used to vibrate internal organs. This vibration creates vomiting, 
loss of balance control and numerous other nasty effects. Due to the current inability to 
channel the waves in a specific direction, the operator would be affected along with the 
intended targets. However, when employed from a platform like a UAV, this drawback 
becomes irrelevant. 
Finally, non-tech measures such as psychological operations need to be included 
as part ofIO. Both the traditional military and the US government have neglected 
psychological operations. This neglect is due to the belief that psyops is an 
unconventional method that produces slow, if any Tesults. In addition, the performance of 
aggressive psyops is often strongly opposed by human rights activists and liberals who 
believe that its performance is somehow immoral. With terrorism and crime both being 
unconventional threats, the conduct of psyops is a clear fit. When analyzing the potential 
of utilizing psyops against terror and crime, it is necessary to expand its traditional role. 
In other words, psyops must not be looked upon as simply dropping flyers and playing 
American music in the hope that the target audience begins to view the world with US 
colored glasses. Instead, perhaps the most nefarious, evil person available should oversee 
III Adams, The Next World War, p. 1;51 
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psyops against terrorists and criminals. The idea is not to have these entities change their 
attitudes, but simply to change their actions. While lying, disception, misinformation, 
threats, embarrassment, and many others are counter to the US definition of psyops as 
"truth projection," they provide excellent possibilities when focused on terror and crime. 
While the conduct of psyops is many times low-tech in nature, the advanced 
technologies mentioned above allow psyops to become increasingly important and 
effective. The interceptio~ or creation of false communications and E-mail can create 
internal fighting or ip.stigate competition, even hatred between rival organizations. 
Concepts as untraditional as telekinesis or hypnosis might also be explored and exploited. 
In conduct of these operations, the operator must remember that these organizations are 
actively engaged in destroying US society. Thus, virtually any action to prevent their 
continued operations can be sufficiently justified, as discussed in chapter 4. Psyops 
should therefore also be a tool of counter terrorist and crime operations, and the conduct· 
of disruptive and destructive actions should be designed to support the larger strategic 
psyops campaign. When confronting these non-state actors, psyops transitions from 
"winning their hearts and minds" to destroying them .. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Exceptionally sophisticated and proficient, terrorist and transnational crime 
organizations have become the threat of the future. Their embrace of advanced computer 
and communications systems has significantly enhanced their efficiency, while providing 
access to new, exceptionally potent weapons systems. Their traditional behavioral 
103 
constraints have been overcome by their excessive greed, hatred and self-righteousness. 
US policy for dealing with these groups has become dangerously antiquated. By 
following its long-standing reactive policy, the US government places the entire nation in 
jeopardy. Only by adopting an aggressive, proactive strategy can these threats be 
constrained. This strategy must incorporate the same technologies that have propelled 
these groups to such increased power. While implementation of the proactive strategy 
incurs an initial cost, the eventual savings are likely to be enormous. Today's advanced 
technology provides the US with the tools necessary to engage in and win the war against 
terror and crime. Policy makers must now display the moral fortitude to implement these 
appropriate and very necessary measures. 
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